



Applying the “Triple Nexus”; between  
Humanitarian, Development, and Peace in  
the Context of Migration Flows from  
Venezuela

GRETA GRANADOS | 2018

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Translated by Beatriz Abellán.

We would like to thank interviewees and other participants for their contributions to this study. Their inputs helped us understand the current situation in the region, as well as its challenges.

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# INDEX

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	3
ACRONYMS	6
TABLE OF FIGURES	8
I. Introduction	10
II. Methodology	12
III. Some key points of the context in the Venezuelan migration crisis	18
IV. International response and coordination mechanisms	23
V. Introduction to the triple nexus approach	27
VI. Main findings of the study	
I. A protracted crisis addressed largely with short-term instruments	27
II. Coordination mechanisms have been strengthened, but challenges remain	30
III. Moving towards ownership of local institutions and organisations in the response is an essential task	33
IV. Growing participation of diaspora organisations	34
V. Lack of greater knowledge and adequate tools to implement the triple nexus	36
VI. The humanitarian component remains central to the response	38
VII. Is it possible to solidify a greater commitment to development and integration?	41
VIII. The necessary but complex inclusion of peacebuilding elements in the crisis response	46
VII. CONCLUSIONS	50
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS	52
IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY	55
X. Annexes	59
I. Semi-structured interview Script	59
II. Survey questionnaire	61

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study aims to address the challenges arising from applying the Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) Nexus in the context of migration flows from Venezuela. The scale of the Venezuelan migration crisis, as well as the limited prospects of its ending, has forced the stakeholders to rethink the response. This research stems from our interest in understanding how the different kind of organisations, international and local, are framing their work and how they are addressing their different aspects. To this end, we have focused on the analysis of three strands: the temporal scope, the coordination mechanisms and the articulation of the actions that make up the triple nexus: humanitarian action, development, and peacebuilding.

The study starts by providing some brief notes justifying its relevance, describing the mixed research methodology (including a survey, interviews, and bibliographic review), and offering key points on the context of the Venezuelan migration crisis. Later, we introduce the international response that has been given to the crisis, comprising the coordination mechanisms and political negotiation initiatives laid out, followed by an overview of the triple nexus approach. Following this first part, we present the findings collected in the light of the analysis of the survey and the systematisation of the interviews. Lastly, a series of general conclusions and recommendations are offered so that the different institutions present in this crisis can strengthen their response, while guaranteeing the rights of the Venezuelan migrants.

The first finding resides on the general agreement that this crisis is of a protracted nature and that return does not appear as a viable alternative, hence a long term approach is needed (98% of the organisations consider it essential to incorporate medium and long term planning). However, only 40% of local organisations incorporate a long term vision in their programmes, largely due to the short-term nature of financing instruments.

Regarding coordination mechanisms, there is accord on the positive role of the R4V Interagency Platform, especially in its capacity to provide information and encourage the growing participation of local organisations. However, there is also a risk of supplanting the role of recipient countries and grassroots organisations, as well as creating confusion with other pre-existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms. On the other hand, challenges are also identified regarding the need to better define common objectives and move towards a logic of contiguum, that is, a simultaneous

implementation of the three components of the triple nexus, overcoming a linear vision.

The role of local organisations and institutions has varied at each stage, initially playing a decisive role, and then taking a secondary place after the arrival of international actors. However, given the long term perspective, the importance of local actors designing and owning the response has been recognised.

The increasing involvement of diaspora organisations in the response is noteworthy. Some sources have, however, voiced concerns over the political risks of including them in the decision making given their non-neutral role in the crisis.

As for the nexus approach, all the organisations surveyed claimed to be in favour of its adoption, despite acknowledging its operationalisation not being profound. Some of the interviewees highlighted the lack of coordination mechanisms to bring together all the organisations and actors operating in each of the three areas of the triple nexus.

In the humanitarian action component, perception regarding the prominence of this type of aid is not homogeneous: local organisations consider that from the outset the focus was placed on the attention to basic needs as opposed to international organisations. On the other hand, there is a fear of moving too quickly to other actions without having responded to the most urgent needs, as opposed to the risk of delaying the evolution towards development plans that consider the host population.

In the last five years as the crisis shows no sign to relent, the appropriateness to introduce development actions has become more relevant. The measures taken by the organisations have revolved around issues of socioeconomic integration, legal support, and assistance. Barriers to regularisation are one of the main concerns of the Venezuelan population as it is a requirement to enter the labour market in a way that guarantees their rights. Recognition of legal status by the host States has been heterogeneous, which has led many organisations to activate advocacy mechanisms.

With regard to the peace component, the vast majority of the organisations participating in the survey consider that they carry out peace building activities. The actions included in this section are those related to fight xenophobia, and, broadly to the prevention and mitigation of violence. The promotion of a culture of peace is seen as a component of integration that would require the adoption of a “do no harm” and conflict sensitivity approaches.

Finally, the study proposes some recommendations on issues such as intensifying coordination, coherence, and complementarity of actions, strengthening localisation, and developing best practices aimed at the proper implementation of the three components of the triple nexus. Among these, it highlights the need to establish medium and long term planning and financing frameworks that are flexible enough to articulate the humanitarian, development, and peace elements more easily, and to allow for adaptation in changing environments.

In addition, the study calls for deepening mechanisms to incorporate non-governmental organisations (NGOs), local governments and diaspora organisations in all phases of the planning as the crisis becomes protracted and more and more development-focused measures are required. This should be done with an emphasis on attention to specific needs of certain groups, without ignoring pre-existing inequalities in terms of gender, age, sexual or ethnic diversity. In addition, interventions should continue to ensure the participation of host communities to reduce potential outbreaks of xenophobia in the face of increased scrutiny of the migrant population in contexts of high poverty and unmet basic needs in the host communities.

The report also introduces a series of recommendations outlining the need to develop tools to address the three areas of the triple nexus in a comprehensive manner. This would entail incorporating new elements into the planning, implementation, and evaluation of the response, such as the “do no harm” approach as well as systematising and sharing experiences regarding solidarity economy initiatives amongst regional countries, coordinating regularisation, or compilation of best practices applying the triple nexus.

# ACRONYMS

CPA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
EU	European Union
FCV	Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
GTRM	Working Group on Refugees and Migrants
ICG	International Contact Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IECAH	Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MIRPS	Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. Regional Comprehensive Framework for Protection and Solutions
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
R4V	Regional Platform for Inter-Agency Coordination (Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela)
RMRP	Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
WW	WeWorld

# TABLE OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Organisations that consider the need for a long term perspective vs. organisations that have a long term plan	28
Figure 2: Organisations by type with a long term plan	29
Figure 3: Participation in coordination mechanisms	30
Figure 4: Importance of strengthening migrant or refugee organisations	35
Figure 5: Knowledge on the triple nexus	37
Figure 6: Organisations by type according to which humanitarian response remains the priority in the current situation	39
Figure 7: Priorities within the "humanitarian" component of the nexus	40
Figure 8: Medium-long term priorities	42
Figure 9: Organisational mandate	43
Figure 10: Priorities under the "development" component of the nexus	44
Figure 11: Organisations by type working in peacebuilding	47
Figure 12: Priorities under the "peace" component of the nexus	48

# I / INTRODUCTION

The complex Venezuelan migration crisis, which has worsened since 2018, has led to a strong response from neighbouring countries and international cooperation. Initially, the response revolved around the provision of basic goods and services and protection tasks within a predominantly humanitarian approach. **The crisis duration and the lack of prospects for a prompt solution are pressuring many organisations to consider alternative strategies.** These new approaches imply incorporating aspects that address the medium and long term and, therefore, the link with development through, fundamentally in the first instance, socio-economic integration. Conversely, growing xenophobia towards the migrant population has led to the implementation of "conflict-sensitive" or "do no harm" strategies that aim to mitigate the possible effects of these situations. This approach also favours a broader conception of social and cultural integration, preventing potential conflicts that this sort of circumstances can generate among groups.

To this end, some donors and development agencies are proposing the Humanitarian-Development- Peace Nexus as a possible approach to this scenario. The need to interlink humanitarian action with development or peacebuilding is something that, in one way or another, is present in numerous scenarios, and the Venezuelan migration crisis is no exception. In addition, the nexus approach raises other questions regarding the search for collective outcomes or coordination and coherence, whose application in this crisis is also relevant.

In any case, beyond the theoretical approaches, it seems relevant to dive into the advantages and potential limitations and disadvantages of operating within a nexus approach, drawing on the build-up field experience.

The study presented here, which is eminently practical in nature, strives to analyse whether the nexus approach is appropriate to operate in this crisis, providing ideas and recommendations for the improvement of medium and long term actions for all organisations.



More specifically, the study aims to:

1. Investigate the operational approaches of the various organisations in this crisis while analyzing their vision in the medium and long term.
2. Understand the extent to which the three components of the nexus are addressed: humanitarian, development, and peace.
3. Analyze the challenges posed by this approach in this specific context, especially in terms of coordination, coherence, and complementarity.
4. Provide training elements for discussion amongst organisations.
5. Propose some elements that can improve work with the migrant population in the future.

To facilitate the understanding of the study, two sections are included at the beginning on a few key points of the Venezuelan migration crisis and on the triple nexus approach.

The study has been launched by the non-governmental organisation WeWorld and the Institute of Studies on Conflicts and Humanitarian Action (IECAH) within the EU-funded project framework "Responding to forced displacement in *Latin America through capacity building and certification on EU Aid Volunteers- INPLACE*", that WeWorld-GVC is carrying out in partnership with Alianza por la Solidaridad, TECHO and Fundación Jesuitas de Bolivia/SJM.

## II / METHODOLOGY

This study was carried out drawing on mixed research methods (qualitative and quantitative) that included semi-structured interviews, a survey, and literature review. The use of a mixed methodology enables us to gain an empirical but nuanced understanding, enriched by the vision of multiple actors in the response to the Venezuelan migration crisis.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 22 organisations working with the Venezuelan migrant population in the region. These organisations included 6 international NGOs, 3 NGOs and local networks, 4 UN agencies, 5 European Union bodies, 1 diaspora organisation and 3 national cooperation agencies. For these interviews, an open questions guideline was followed which allowed the interviewees to stress those questions more relevant to their organisation.

As for the survey, it consisted of a questionnaire of 27 questions available in Spanish and Portuguese (Annex 1 and Annex 2). A total of 47 responses were collected from organisations from Ecuador (11), Peru (10), Colombia (15), Panama (1), Bolivia (1), Brazil (7) and Chile (2). Of the 47 responses, 29 were from international NGOs, 10 from local NGOs, 7 from international organisations and one from an international donor. Interviews and the survey were conducted during the months of September and October 2021.

The literature review covered reports and academic articles on the regional migration state and academic articles addressing the current state of regional migration and the nexus approach. It also built upon previous work carried out by WeWorld, (2020)(2021) both on the nexus approach and on the Venezuelan migration crisis. These readings enabled us to have a far-reaching view of context as well as a better understanding of and the strategic and legal framework behind the triple nexus in these situations.

Given the preliminary character of this study, we are compelled to mention its limitations. On the one hand, despite aiming to obtain the greatest diversity of actors at the geographical and

organisational level both in the responses to the survey and in the interviews, it has not always been possible. There was greater participation by international organisations with a presence in the territory than by purely local organisations.

On the other hand, the lower level of response by certain countries can be treated as an indicator of the existence of less action in this area. However, these limitations do not lessen the validity of the conclusions since they offer a contrasted and solid analysis of the situation. We also hope that this study will encourage further research and monitoring of the implementation of the triple nexus approach in the context of the Venezuelan migration crisis.

The research team was formed by Francisco Rey, Beatriz Abellán and Andrés Felipe Gómez from IECAH, with the support of Corrado Scropetta and Francesco Michele from WeWorld. The team would like to thank all the people and institutions that have participated in the survey and interviews for their contribution.

### **III / SOME KEY POINTS OF THE CONTEXT IN THE VENEZUELAN MIGRATION CRISIS**

Since 2012, Venezuela has been immersed in a political, institutional, and economic crisis that has led to a large-scale migration crisis (Corrales, 2017, p. 31), all this in an already complex regional mobility crisis background. Political instability in Venezuela is characterised by a pronounced polarisation and high levels of insecurity fuelling social tensions. The international fall in oil prices, along with macroeconomic mismanagement by the administration of Nicolás Maduro, has led Venezuela to experience one of the worse cases of hyperinflation in recent history (Vera, 2018). In addition of hyperinflation, and its dire economic consequences, international sanctions have had harmful impacts on the entire population. (OHCHR, 2021). This political, institutional, economic, and social crisis has given rise to a serious worsening of living conditions in Venezuela. The absence of basic items, hygiene products and adequate nutrition, together with severely deteriorated infrastructure, has led many people to an unmanageable situation. The widespread humanitarian impacts are undeniable. In this regard, the concept of Complex Humanitarian Emergency has become widely used to describe the situation. The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that 24% of the population lives in a state of moderate food insecurity and 7.9% in a serious situation (Human Rights Watch, 2016)(Cartaya, Reyna, & Ramsey, 2020). Data from the National Survey on Living Conditions show the extent of the crisis in many areas such as institutional, educational, energy, access to basic services or health. The deterioration of political, social, and economic conditions in Venezuela resulted in a mass exodus (World Food Programme, 2020)(UCAB, 2021). **As of October 2021, the R4V estimates that around 5.9 million Venezuelans are living abroad, of which 4.8 million are in Latin America and the Caribbean (R4V, 2021).**

The socio-demographic profile of the Venezuelan migrant population has evolved over the years. In the period between 1999 and 2014, migration flows were low, with an estimated 700,000 people leaving. Initially, migrant´s profile came from the upper layers of society, made up mainly of business sectors, students, traders, and professionals. Amid the causes for migrating was the fear of the

economic measures taken by the Venezuelan government, such as the expropriation and nationalisation of private companies as well as the suppression of civil liberties (DANE, 2021, p. 6). Broadly, this population arrived at the new destination countries with sufficient economic resources and the ability to integrate quickly into the local economy (Osorio & Phélan, 2020, p. 118). As of 2015, the type of migration underwent major changes. With Venezuela plunged into a deep economic crisis and with political polarisation and institutional instability at its peak, the migratory flow increased exponentially, leading to the departure of 5.9 million people in just five years. Currently, the vast majority of those who have left Venezuela are individuals with limited resources who seek to escape the difficult living conditions.

**Migratory flows are mixed as they do not consist of a single category of migrants but are made up of both refugees or asylum seekers, as well as economic migrants and other types of migrants with protection implications** (IOM, 2019). According to R4V figures, more than 170,000 Venezuelans have received refugee status, although in total there are more than 850,000 asylum seekers around the world. The remaining 5.7 million Venezuelans are considered migrants, and to date more than 2.5 million live under some other legal figure, with varying levels of protection, in the recipient country. Out of the total population that has left Venezuela, 82% have settled in Latin American countries. By far, Colombia has been the largest recipient of migrants and refugees with more than 1.7 million as of 2021. Followed by Peru, with one million; Chile and Ecuador, with almost half a million each; and, to a lesser extent, Brazil, Argentina, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Costa Rica.

The Venezuelan migration crisis is especially relevant because of its magnitude, representing the second largest mobility crisis in the world after Syria as well as the pronounced political character that has been the subject of great international attention. Some authors have denounced the instrumentalisation of the migration crisis by regional governments to cover-up other national emergencies (Pardo, 2021).

**According to R4V figures, around 3.84 million Venezuelan migrants in destination countries have unmet needs and difficulties in accessing basic services.** Socioeconomic status, lack of financial

resources and regulatory barriers are the main obstacles they face in meeting their basic needs. The priorities of refugees and migrants in Venezuela are access to food, shelter and finding employment (or sources of income) according to joint needs assessments carried out by each country's regional coordination mechanisms (R4V, 2021). Needs vary by country, with concern for housing being the most prominent in the case of Ecuador, compared to limited access to food in Colombia (R4V, 2021). The unequal gender impact of this crisis, by which Venezuelan women have borne much of the burden of migration, as caregivers and in some cases as new heads of household have also been stressed (CARE, 2020). This differential impact of the crisis and the new gender dynamics generated as a result have led to specific analyses to ensure that the specificities of each population groups are contemplated in the response (CARE, 2020).

Insecurity and lack of protection faced by Venezuelans both within and outside their borders is a matter of serious concern. In September 2021, the Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) decried the continuous violations of human rights within the country including extrajudicial executions, political persecution, forced disappearances among other crimes that could constitute crimes against humanity when committed systematically and widely against the population. At the borders, particularly between Venezuela and Colombia, characterised by low state control, migrants and refugees are exposed to criminal gangs and trafficking networks as they cross through irregular border crossings or "trochas" (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In the workplace, migrants also face threats to their physical security and integrity as a result of their vulnerability and risk from the rise of xenophobia. Migrant status intersects with the specific pre-existing characteristics of each individual (their gender, age, race, ethnicity, sexual identity and orientation, disability), which affects the forms of violence and barriers to which they are exposed.

**The massive arrival of Venezuelan migrants and refugees to the countries of the region overlaps with other migratory dynamics in the Latin American and Caribbean region driven by various socio-economic, political, and environmental factors.** On the one hand, the unresolved armed conflict in Colombia has pushed thousands of migrants and refugees to neighbouring countries such as Ecuador, Venezuela, and Peru, causing also more than seven million internally displaced people

(UNHCR, 2018). Last year, the migration of Haitians has also increased, around 200,000, to South American countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, caused by the continuous disasters and in particular the terrible consequences of the 2010 earthquake and the continuing political crisis. (R4V, 2021)(IOM, 2021). Other transit points, such as the Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama or the Chile-Bolivia border are extremely dangerous and expose them to high risks of violence, exploitation, abuse, and extortion. Conversely, in recent decades, the flow of migrants from Central America through long and dangerous routes to Mexico and the United States has not ceased (IOM, 2021). The political crisis in Nicaragua coupled with poverty, violence, and the impacts of climate change in the countries of the Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala) has generated bidirectional and intraregional migratory flows to the North (USA) and, to a lesser extent, to the South (Costa Rica and Panama) (Migration Data Portal, 2021). Meanwhile, an upsurge in cross-continental transit flows, including Asia and Africa, has been identified as a route to reach the USA via Central America(IOM, 2021).

**In this section, it should be noted that the initial response to the migration crisis was quite disjointed at the regional and global levels, with no joint coordinated action, as both recipient countries and donors acted independently.** In Latin American host countries, despite the existence of an open regulatory framework based on the Cartagena Declaration and given the inability of administrative structures to cope with the scale of migratory flows, governments created ad hoc regularisation mechanisms for the Venezuelan migrant population. Not until 2018, the UN Secretary General, in view of the urgent need to give a coordinated and regional response to the migration crisis, proposed the creation of the so-called Regional Interagency Coordination Platform (also known as Response to Venezuelans or R4V) (Chaves, Amaral, & Mora, 2021). UNHCR, for its part, published a "Guidance Note on the Outflow of Venezuelans" to clarify the applicable legal protection frameworks (UNHCR, 2018).

## **Impact of COVID on the Venezuelan migration crisis**

The COVID 19 pandemic has had an exacerbating effect on pre-existing problems on the continent and, particularly, on the Venezuelan migration crisis. The consequences have been felt at different levels. On the one hand, the measures to curb the pandemic have caused a worsening of national economies with the consequent jobs loss, with a special impact on the informal sector formed mainly by migrants and women. On the other hand, mobility restrictions imposed by governments have made it difficult to deliver humanitarian aid and has paralysed development plans significantly impacting migration in the region (Mixed Migration Centre, 2021). Likewise, this economic deterioration has generated severe social unrest, which has led to waves of xenophobia against the Venezuelan migrant population.



AS OF OCT 2021 LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

# VENEZUELAN REFUGEES & MIGRANTS IN THE REGION

**R4V** Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela



**4.87M**

APPROX. VENEZUELAN REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN



**5.91M**

TOTAL APPROX. VENEZUELAN REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN THE WORLD



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations  
 Creation date: Oct 2021, more information available in: <http://R4V.info>

Source: R4V

## IV / INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE AND COORDINATION MECHANISMS

The extent of the Venezuelan migration crisis, its impact on the entire region and its progressive aggravation, amid other factors, propelled the setup of international and regional mechanisms to face the serious consequences of the migration of the Venezuelan population. Some of them are more focused on the political and harmonisation aspects between the reception and protection instruments in each country of destination, while others address thematic and sectoral coordination to better tackle the effects of the crisis on migrants, refugees, or asylum seekers.

### Quito Process

The First Declaration, of the Quito Process, of a political nature, but with undeniable aspects of assistance and protection was signed in September 2018 with the participation of 11 countries. **The main objective of the Declaration is to "exchange information and good practices, with a view to articulating regional coordination with respect to the migration crisis of Venezuelan citizens in the region"**. The Declaration committed the signatories to facilitate the movement of Venezuelan refugees and migrants and urged the government of Caracas to take measures for the provision of identity and travel documents for its nationals. This first meeting spurred the so-called Quito Process, which has since approved seven "Joint Declarations on human mobility of Venezuelan citizens in the region" and is currently made up of 13 countries. Some milestones of this process are the following:

- Second Declaration (November 2018). The action plan is approved with three approaches: regularisation of the migratory status of Venezuelan nationals in the region; regional cooperation with Venezuela and other countries; international cooperation.
- Fourth Declaration (July 2019). The Roadmap of the Buenos Aires Chapter, with multiple innovations, is approved including the proposal of a Regional Mobility Card, Reception and Assistance Centres for Migrants and Refugees, in addition to the proposal to create a Group

of Friendly Countries of the Quito Process, and the organisation of a regional workshop on trafficking in persons, among others.

- In September 2020, a total of 13 countries signed the Sixth Joint Declaration, boosting the Quito Process and adding new challenges such as family reunification and the impact of COVID-19 on the Venezuelan refugee and migrant population. Both the Technical Secretariat and the Group of Friends of the Quito Process are also formally constituted (Quito Process, 2021).

Since its origin, the Quito Process has had a predominantly political approach to the crisis. Yet, to some extent it has also addressed social and protection aspects in the crisis from a coherent regional logic bringing together additional international stakeholders. Eduardo Stein, UNHCR-IOM Joint Special Representative for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela emphasised at the sixth technical meeting, held in Chile in September 2021, that "the Quito Process has become a benchmark for regional coordination and has allowed us to strengthen the response despite the complex framework of the pandemic. In the face of the economic recovery of our region, it is essential to work for the integration and inclusion of refugees and migrants in national protection policies and programmes if we want to provide an adequate and effective response that favours us all."

## **Regional Interagency Coordination Platform: R4V**

In April 2018, from a needs-based rationale, the UN Secretary-General gave guidelines to IOM and UNHCR to lead and coordinate the regional response to the situation of refugees and migrants from Venezuela seeking access to basic rights and services, protection, as well as self-sufficiency and socio-economic integration. Following this briefing, **the Regional Interagency Coordination Platform was established as a forum to coordinate response efforts in 17 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, with a particular focus on achieving coherence and consistency all along.**

At the national and subregional levels, the Regional Platform is complemented by local coordination mechanisms. The national and subregional platforms, working directly with host country governments, are responsible for the operational coordination and implementation of the Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan (RMRP). Such coordination platforms are present in Brazil,

Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru - at the national level- and in the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico and the Southern Cone- at the subregional level. Its configuration is mindful of the context and the operational capacities of governments and RMRP partners, taking into account existing coordination structures. **Since then, the Platform has launched RMRPs as an annual response planning tool.** At the same time, the national platforms, Working Groups on Refugees and Migrants (GTRM in its Spanish acronyms) or with other denomination, have promoted coordination with the various actors working on these issues. The Platform as a whole and its national counterparts are currently the main mechanisms for operational coordination among all organisations. In some contexts, such as Colombia where there is a strong humanitarian coordination architecture led by OCHA through the Humanitarian Country Team, the implementation of these new mechanisms (The Interagency Group of Mixed Migratory Flows (GIFMM in its Spanish acronyms) as it has been named) has sparked confusion that we will analyse in detail in the relevant section.

## **International donor conferences**

**Solidarity Conference on Venezuela Refugee and Migrant Crisis** took place in Brussels on 28-29 October 2019, organised by the European Commission, with the collaboration of UNHCR and IOM. This event served to send a strong message of support to refugees and migrants from Venezuela, as well as to host countries and communities in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The aim of the event was **to raise awareness about the Venezuelan refugee and migrant crisis and the efforts being made by host countries and communities.** Good practices and achievements of host countries were analysed and international support for a coordinated regional response was confirmed. A call was made for a global and inclusive partnership where solidarity and responsibility are shared by the international community as a whole, but also between the public and private sectors.

It was attended by 120 delegations, including EU institutions and Member States, the most affected Latin American and Caribbean countries, donor countries, UN agencies, the private sector, NGOs, civil society organisations and development actors, including international financial institutions.

The Conference recognised the severe and complex political, socio-economic, and human rights

crisis in Venezuela that led to one of the most serious situations of displacement worldwide. The flow of people remains constant while resources and means of financing are far below needs. The Conference praised the great solidarity shown by countries in the region and acknowledge the significant challenges they face. Participants reaffirmed their strong commitment to continue to protect and assist Venezuelan refugees and migrants as well as to support the efforts of host countries, by ensuring sustainable integration into host communities.

The second International Donors' Conference in solidarity with refugees and migrants from Venezuela in Latin America and the Caribbean was held on 26 May 2020, organised by the European Union and the Government of Spain, with the support of UNHCR and IOM. More than 40 countries together with United Nations agencies, international financial institutions and representatives of national and international civil society addressed the situation that millions of Venezuelans who have left their country are living.

The Conference aimed to raise the awareness of the international community on this unprecedented crisis, mobilise resources to assist the displaced population and key host communities, address the situation recently aggravated by COVID-19 and facilitate greater engagement and coordination of stakeholders.

As a result, the international donor community pledged \$2,79 billion, including \$653 million in concessions, to provide assistance to refugees and migrants from Venezuela in the Latin American and Caribbean host countries. These funds are also intended to assist host communities under strain, notably after coronavirus restrictions.

The last Donors' Conference was held in Canada in June 2021 with financial commitments of around \$1,5 billion, both in grants and loans.<sup>1</sup> Some donors, such as the European Union, committed their funds to three pillars: humanitarian, development and combating xenophobia (European Commission, 2021)

## **Political negotiation for the resolution of the crisis**

The first initiative of manifest political character has been the Lima Group, a multilateral body established after the so-called Lima Declaration. On August 8, 2017, representatives of 14

<sup>1</sup> We have not been able to determine the number of funds allocated and those used. There is no open source that collects such information.

countries met with the aim of following up and accompanying the Venezuelan opposition to seek a peaceful solution to the crisis in Venezuela. Amid other issues, the group demands the release of political prisoners, calls for free elections, offers humanitarian aid and criticises the falling-out of the institutional order in the South American country.

Initially, **12 American countries signed the Declaration: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Peru. Guyana, Haiti, and Saint Lucia subsequently joined.** Bolivia joined in 2019. It was also endorsed by Barbados, the United States, Grenada, and Jamaica. Furthermore, organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the European Union, and the Venezuelan opposition, gave their support to this document.

**In January 2019, the European Union decided to launch, together with some Latin American countries, the International Contact Group (ICG)** on Venezuela and in conjunction with the Eastern Republic of Uruguay they hosted the inaugural meeting of the International Contact Group on Venezuela, in February 2019. The meeting took place in Montevideo at the ministerial level.

The ICG aims to "contribute to creating the conditions for the emergence of a political and peaceful process that allows Venezuelans to determine their own future, by holding free, transparent and credible elections, in line with the country's Constitution," according to the EU. The Contact Group brings together the EU and seven of its Member States (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden) and Latin American countries (Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Uruguay).

**Conversely, the OAS has launched various proposals and welcomed the creation of the Coalition for Venezuela,** within the framework of the 49th OAS Assembly in 2019. This Coalition is made up of 65 civil society organisations from 23 countries of the continent.

**It is also worth mentioning the negotiations initiated in Mexico, in September 2021, between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Unitary Platform of Venezuela,** facilitated by Norway and accompanied by the Netherlands and Russia. These dialogues follow the signing, on August 13, of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two political sides to reach a series of agreements leading to elections. In that document, seven discussion points were set out including political rights and electoral safeguards.

## V / INTRODUCTION TO THE TRIPLE NEXUS APPROACH

The Humanitarian- Development- Peace Nexus (HDP) approach is one of the most recent proposals to better respond to protracted crises, such as the Venezuelan migration crisis. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), one of its main supporters, states that applying the nexus will help to "strengthen collaboration, coherence and complementarity" between humanitarian interventions, development, and peace "in order to reduce overall vulnerability and the number of unmet needs, strengthen risk management capacities and address roots causes of conflict." (OECD, 2021) Prior to the DAC, the triple nexus approach emerged within the United Nations framework "New Way of Working", which was discussed at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (WHS). This idea propounds actors working together to achieve collective outcomes which in turn, will enhance cohesion (ICVA, 2018). In the same regard, the so-called "Grand Bargain" approved at the WHS proposes the need to link humanitarian work with development. However, it is important to note that the will to transcend the structure of silos and, in particular, connect the humanitarian and development spheres is not new and had already been raised under other names since the '80s. For example, the proposals for "linking humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and development" (LRRD), discussions on the concept of resilience and the introduction of approaches such as the transition from *continuum* to *contiguum* in this interlink between humanitarian and development (IECAH, 2010).

In 2019, the DAC, at its High-Level Meeting, drafted the Recommendation on the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus, as a non-binding legal instrument, to guide and support the adhering States in the implementation (OECD, 2018). In essence, it establishes a series of theoretical elements that make up the triple nexus, inter alia, the concept of collective outcomes, the joined-up approach, support for local actors and evidence-based, flexible, multi-year and predictable financing. These commitments are, undoubtedly, demanding for donors.

The triple nexus continues to stir up a debate amongst the members of each sector, particularly within the humanitarian field. **There are fears that including this approach in certain crises could aggravate the conflict and hinder humanitarian assistance by diminishing the perception of neutrality if politically sensitive issues are considered.** The plausible risk of instrumentalisation of humanitarian efforts in peacebuilding agendas is also of concern. Given this preoccupation, it is important to note that the DAC recommendation states that the coordination of the nexus must respect the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence (Rey, 2020). **An assessment of each crisis or situation in a fragile context is advised to ensure that activities apply a "conflict-sensitive" approach** and do not lead to unintended negative consequences. In addition, it is stressed that stakeholders must ensure that the application of the approach does not impair the rapidity and flexibility of the humanitarian response (OECD, 2021).

From a conceptual perspective, but with practical implications, **the triple nexus arises to take advantage of the comparative advantages of each sector: humanitarian, development, and peace.** The collective outcomes that are aspired to achieve through coordination are understood as a measurable result or impact agreed jointly and reinforced by a combined effort across the different actors according to their mandate. (OECD, 2021) The Joined-up Approach refers to the coordination, programming and coherent financing and complementarity of humanitarian, development, and peace actions, respecting humanitarian principles and the needs approach in humanitarian action. In addition, to improve coordination, gender- and risk-sensitive analysis of the underlying and structural causes of the conflict is mandated. It is also recommended to provide appropriate resources to national and local authorities and to prioritise local counterparts in the allocation of funds to enhance efficient coordination. With regard to funding, DAC recommends that better funding be provided to address existing funding gaps and to establish multi-year funding strategies that promote the achievement of collective outcomes.

However, the OECD has not been the sole international actor to make a statement on the nexus. The EU has also taken a stand in favour of adopting the triple nexus. In May 2017, the Council of the European Union adopted the Recommendation to operationalise the dual nexus and has also adapted its funding instruments to this approach (see "EU's Comprehensive Approach" and EUTF). In the recommendation, the EU stresses the need to "promote complementarity, synergies,



cooperation between humanitarian and development and other relevant actors", and in 2018 added the peace component (European Commission, 2020). Following this decision, the EU launched two pilot programmes for the operationalisation of the triple nexus in Uganda and Sudan. The plans include the application of a conflict-sensitive approach in order to "avoid unwanted negative impacts" while "maximising the positive impact of sustainable peace". Other institutions such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have also taken a stance on the issue in favour of strengthening the triple nexus. In its recommendation, the Movement advocates increasing cooperation and coherence between the different actors "not to work under a single framework, but to share a common strategic vision with joint objectives" and respecting humanitarian principles while applying a context-specific approach (Red Cross EU Office & ICRC, 2018)


**It is worth mentioning that the triple nexus approach is consistent with other strategic and operational frameworks aimed at providing a response that is better suited to long term crises.** On the one hand, the World Bank supports the use of the concept of "fragility" in a broader way, which includes countries with Country Policy and Institutional Assessment levels (CPIA) <sup>2</sup> of less than 3.2%, either with the presence of the UN Department of Peace Operations, or with a number of internally displaced persons and refugees representing more than 1% of the population. (World Bank, 2021)(World Bank, 2020) This new definition, expands the number of countries addressing the problem of "fragility," has meant an operational shift in the way the World Bank responds to situations of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV). This decision is reflected in the new risk-based approach that promotes early interventions to mitigate sources of potential conflict.

Another key framework in this area is the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), adopted in 2016 by the UN General Assembly. In the Americas, the CRRF was implemented through the Regional Comprehensive Framework for Protection and Solutions (MIRPS). The CRRF is one of the two annexes that make up the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UNHCR, 2016). The MIRPS proposes a list of commitments and good practices aimed at large-scale movement of refugees in the region. It encourages moving towards durable solutions, always

<sup>2</sup> The CPIA consists of 16 criteria grouped into four equally weighted groups: Economic Management, Structural Policies, Policies for Social Inclusion and Equity, and Management and Institutions of the Sector public. For each of the 16 criteria, countries are rated on a scale of 1 (low) to 6 (high).

bearing in mind the particularities of the local context.

The **triple nexus** has been implemented with greater or lesser success in conflict-affected contexts such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Mali, Nigeria, Malawi, Colombia, Myanmar, or South Sudan. However, it is a recent approach and is still in the operationalisation phase. Efforts are being made to move from high-level global forums to the programmes of international and local actors and also in the non-governmental sector progress has been proposed. It is therefore essential that the triple nexus remains sensitive to the process of localisation, that is, "seeking a commitment from communities, authorities, local and regional and national, and the private sector" (WeWorld, 2020). This move not only implies the transfer of responsibilities to local actors but them taking a greater leadership role drafting strategies and programmes and adopting a community vision.



Source: Sipri

## VI / MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The focus of the study revolves around the relevance of applying the triple nexus approach to the Venezuelan migration crisis, mainly looking at three key aspects of the nexus:

- Temporal scope of the crisis and the responses given over the years.
- Mechanisms for coordination, complementarity and the search for coherence put in place.
- Articulation between the three components of the triple nexus: humanitarian, development, and peace.

These three aspects have guided the design of the survey, as well as of the semi-structured interview script (Annex 3). From the analysis of the survey's responses and interviews we extracted a set of findings that we present below.

### VI.I / A protracted crisis addressed largely with short-term instruments

Overall, there is a perception that the Venezuelan migration crisis will not end in the short or medium term, rendering it vital to plan a long term response. Nor is the return, as we have seen, a relevant option at the present time. **According to survey's results, 98% of organisations deem it essential to incorporate medium and long term plans.**


Unlike other similar global crises, several of the interviewees highlighted that the case of the Venezuelan migration crisis showed that it was feasible to embrace a more profound vision of action. Some organisations cited examples of local GTRMs and other coordination mechanisms that were working on two, three, and even five-year plan documents.

However, the interviews showed a disparity of assessments between international organisations and local NGOs regarding the nature of the immediate response. International organisations, both UN agencies and INGOs, ascertain that from the outset there was a greater emphasis on the long

term focus compared to other crises, while local NGO actors mostly stressed that the immediate response mainly focused on the humanitarian aspect and then evolved towards long term perspectives.

More importantly, the survey revealed that, despite the fact that the vast majority of organisations consider the need for a long term perspective, so far only 40% of them have incorporated a medium /long term approach into their programmatic documents.


**Figure 1**  
Organisations that consider the need for a long term perspective vs. organisations that have a long term plan.



What is more, this percentage decreases to 30% when looking at local NGOs, which lag behind in long term planning compared to international organisations and INGOs. The only donor who participated in the survey did not have a long term plan either.

Figure 2

Organisations by type with a long term plan.



According to the interviewees, the difficulty of incorporating medium and long term elements into crises responds to the financing instruments that NGOs receive to assist the migrant population.


Several organisations also stressed that donor agencies generally offer resources for short-term projects (from three months up to a year), which does not allow for much deeper interventions focused on institutional strengthening, sustainable economic projects, amid other development measures. This short-term view of funding instruments has a particular impact on local NGOs, whose capacity for financial independence is lower. They are therefore forced to adapt to these time constraints in their programmes.

While long term lack of funding is a widely acknowledged issue, interviews have also expressed that some international donors are making efforts in this direction. In the 2019 Recommendation, the DAC mandated adherent members to adapt flexible multi-year funding plans as the current funding structure hinders the operationalisation of the triple nexus in development plans.

## VI.II / Coordination mechanisms have been strengthened, but challenges remain

There is widespread agreement that the institutional architecture to cope with the Venezuelan migration crisis has been enhanced. In that respect, recent progress enabled medium-term planning focused, mainly, on integration aspects, economic, social, labour, and cultural among others (November 2021). Proof of this is that three out of four organisations surveyed participate either in the coordination mechanisms of GTRM (41%) or in the Humanitarian Network (34%).

Figure 3  
Participation in coordination mechanisms.



The emphasis on the integration of the migrant population as a step towards more comprehensive development actions is shared by most organisations. As we will see in a later section, there is a risk of considering development work, only, or fundamentally, as integration.

The leading role that the Regional Platform for Interagency Coordination R4V has been taking through the elaboration of the RMRP is recognised as highly positive. The growing incorporation of all kinds of organisations, such as local NGOs and CSOs, into national platforms is regarded as a

positive sign. The Platform has become the reference mechanism in such coordination. The information products, analyses and diagnostics launched from R4V are also the subject of positive assessments by all entities. In that respect, several interviews also showed the good understanding between UNHCR and IOM directing the R4V, in contrast to the discrepancies emerging in other crises.

The limits of this mechanism are also subject to comments, "Platforms such as the GTRM have served mainly to share information, but more work still needs to be done on defining a coordinated response". In the collection, analysis and exchange of information, the recognition of the positive role of R4V is widespread yet when it comes to the coordinated response planning, the agreement is somewhat minor.

However, **the risks posed by the existence of such a mechanism, directed from international agencies, have been stressed in interviews from various viewpoints.** First, considering that R4V is replacing, even supplanting, country efforts; and that the UN should have made additional efforts to promote host countries' initiatives by strengthening public structures and by wholeheartedly supporting the Quito Process. This position, which at first marked by humanitarian needs may have been reasonable, it can now represent a risk or, at least, an obstacle at a time when more participation of national actors is needed. In some interviews, the fact that coordination still depends on the personality and will of individuals who make up the different organisations was raised. There is also a lack of coordination among regional governments and clear criteria in the distribution of resources from donors.

Secondly, R4V led by UNHCR, and IOM has brought confusion and duplication in some aspects with pre-existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms such as REDLAC, ROLAC, or the Humanitarian Country Teams coordinated by OCHA. The case of Colombia, where a solid humanitarian architecture has existed for years, was mentioned in several interviews. It is globally accepted that the so-called *back-to-back*<sup>3</sup> in Colombia has worked and has served particularly small

<sup>3</sup> The use of this term has become popular, especially in organizations in Colombia, to refer to joint work that seeks synergies between them.

organisations as it allows not to duplicate coordination efforts but also to address structural issues. At the local level it works successfully, yet at the national level coordination must be improved. In this same line of reflection, some interviewees pointed out that, in a context of high complexity in terms of human mobility in the region, the existence of specific mechanisms for the Venezuelan population disregarding other groups is a constraint to their work.

A third suggested area of improvement is **the need to better define common strategic objectives and achievements**. As previously mentioned, there has been significant progress in the exchange of information, but it has become apparent that coordination was rolled out hastily and therefore, not as intended by the triple nexus approach. There was no previous nexus-type consensus that would determine these common objectives beyond meeting basic needs. Not even among institutions such as the European Commission, that support both humanitarian action through DG-ECHO and development through other instruments and mechanisms, there was such a vision as would be appropriate with a triple nexus approach, although efforts are being done in that sense. The siloed financing architecture continues to pose challenges for organisations willing to operate within a nexus approach.

Along the same lines, a fourth endeavour would be to **move from an overly sequential *continuum-type* logic** (first humanitarian aid and then development and peace) to **a *contiguum* type** in which work around the three components of the nexus can converge.<sup>4</sup> This requires planning by the coordination mechanisms. Unfortunately, all indicators seem to suggest that humanitarian needs will continue but that, at the same time, it is crucial to emphasise the development component through integration or other avenues and the element of peace.

From a broader viewpoint, beyond R4V, many interviews delved into **the necessary coordination of donors to establish common funding criteria** that would be better suited to the crisis' demands: multiannual funding cycles; financing mechanisms that do not obstruct the nexus, among others. Some interviews criticised donors to the extent that they claim to support the nexus, when *de facto* their funding mechanisms hinders its practical implementation.

<sup>4</sup> While conducting the research, some experiences of this nature (where the start of development actions with a medium term vision converged in time with the provision of humanitarian assistance) came up.



## **VI.III / Moving towards ownership of local institutions and organisations in the response is an essential task**

In terms of localisation, the response to the Venezuelan migration crisis shows that the participation of local communities, religious institutions and diaspora organisations has been varied and contingent on timing, the nature of the local organisation, and the ability of the leading organisations in each country to locate the response.

According to some organisations interviewed in countries such as Colombia, Ecuador or Peru, grassroots organisations played a crucial role in the early stages of the response to the migration crisis. In the initial moments, while international organisations and large NGOs were beginning to mobilise resources and define their responses, these grassroots organisations, such as religious and charitable communities, established temporary shelters and coordinated the delivery of basic goods and food at border crossings.

However, some of the interviewees argued that the role of local organisations shifted to an ancillary role as the crisis attracted greater international attention. Based on several organisations interviewed, few local organisations initially joined the local GTRM. Their participation, on certain occasions, came down to providing up-to-date information on the ground – particularly during the months of COVID-19 restrictions.

Today, several individuals highlighted during their interviews that the interest of international agencies in involving communities and civil society in the response to the crisis has intensified. Additionally, the linkage of local humanitarian organisations has increased over time. **The participation of local organisations in coordination mechanisms such as R4V has been growing significantly during the crisis.** However, they stressed that IOM, UNHCR and larger and more experienced international NGOs continue to take the lead in defining the response and that their relationship with smaller communities and organisations remains under a vertical structure.

As the crisis has spread and stakeholders admit the need for long term plans, several organisations interviewed acknowledge that local governments must play an important role in designing and coordinating the response. This can be observed especially now that development elements, such as the socio-economic integration of migrants and refugees, monetary assistance and training in productive projects take on greater relevance.

In conclusion, **the adoption of longer-term prospects has led the organisations directing the response to consider with greater relevance the role played by local governments and host communities** in the drafting and execution of the implementation strategies. However, local NGOs are still overshadowed by the presence and leadership of large agencies such as IOM and UNHCR. The lack of participation of local actors in strategic planning prevents a true localisation, in which they actively lead the response.


## **VI.IV / Growing participation of diaspora organisations**

Just as interest in engaging governments and local organisations has grown, so has the **willingness to articulate Venezuelan diaspora organisations in recipient countries**. These organisations have been emerging in the vast majority of countries in the region to advocate for addressing the needs of Venezuelan migrants and refugees in the region. Recently, a large part of these grassroots organisations has been articulated under coordination platforms such as the Coalition for Venezuela, which was born within the framework of the OAS 49<sup>th</sup> Assembly in 2019 in Medellin. Currently, it is composed of 65 organisations. With this articulation, organisations have sought to open space as increasingly relevant actors to address the crisis. Several of them have raised funds from international cooperation to implement humanitarian, development, and peace projects in the communities in which they operate.

In general terms, international actors such as NGOs and donors believed that the participation of the Venezuelan diaspora in the crisis response was of great importance and that their role should increase. For example, the survey revealed that organisations overwhelmingly consider supporting refugee and migrant organisations to be a major activity. Some NGOs interviewed have even

allocated resources to strengthening diaspora organisations in administrative and organisational matters.

**Figure 4**  
Importance of strengthening migrant or refugee organisations.



Despite the diaspora gaining space, they aim to move from mere implementers to having a strong voice in response coordination spaces such as local GTRMs or similar bodies. **So far, several people interviewed considered that the role of the diaspora has been relegated to being partners in a response that is built from the top down.** In this sense, they criticise that the voice of those who best know the needs of the migrant population has been excluded from the instances where strategies are being defined.

In addition, several organisations interviewed expressed their reluctance and caution to deepen their relationship with diaspora organisations and to open up more space for them in the humanitarian response. This position mainly responds to the **concern of some organisations that humanitarian action should be exploited by diaspora organisations pursuing political aims.** In some cases, they consider that some of these organisations can make use of resources without strictly

adhering to the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality, and that the distribution of services offered by them may respond to the political orientation of each of these organisations.

Therefore, while some organisations believe that diaspora organisations should continue to work and take steps to ensure that they properly adopt humanitarian principles, others believe that political risks cannot be assumed. Some organisations suggested that working closely with the diaspora could hurt the limited space that has been opened up to carry out humanitarian activities within Venezuela.

In addition, some organisations interviewed considered it inappropriate for diaspora organisations to play the dual role of implementers and beneficiaries of international cooperation projects. Previous experiences in which some diaspora organisations favoured a small circle of their beneficiaries have generated distrust and reluctance to select them as partners for humanitarian projects.


As we can see, there is progress towards the engagement of diaspora organisations. However, the political risks that working with them entails have limited their participation in the coordination and decision-making mechanisms of the crisis response for the time being.

## **VI.V / Lack of greater knowledge and adequate tools to implement the triple nexus**

Regarding the triple nexus application in the Venezuelan migratory context, **63% of the organisations claimed to know the triple nexus, while the understanding of its implications is not profound. 100% of organisations consider it an appropriate approach to migration crisis.** It also points out the relevance of applying triple nexus for a long term crisis such as that of Venezuela. International actors have more knowledge of the nexus, donors (100%) and international organisations (71.4%) than local actors (40%).

Figure 5

Knowledge on the triple nexus.



One of the problems identified for implementing of the triple nexus and guaranteeing its operability is to create the necessary mechanisms to agree with all organisations and people in the three areas regarding the definition of criteria and forms to ensure coherence and complementarity between actors of the three sectors as well as donors and recipients. On the other hand, the current operationalisation follows a sequential logic, that is, first the activities are being carried out separately and not simultaneously and with coherent approaches, as proposed by the nexus.

To the question of the survey: "Do you think it is an appropriate approach to the Venezuelan crisis?" it is valued that this approach allows "to guarantee the attention of immediate needs, while ensuring long term investment to address the systemic causes that contribute towards the required transformation". It also allows progress towards "a more inclusive and lasting impact".

In this sense, a participant expressed: "This is a mixed crisis, that is, it has a group that needs a response to its immediate needs (walkers and new arrivals) and, on the other hand, the vast majority (those with a vocation of permanence) that is in a protracted crisis. The triple nexus approach is appropriate, precisely because it covers the needs of the two groups and strengthens the actions of social cohesion aimed at building peace".

Likewise, **implementing the triple nexus allows meeting immediate needs while addressing systemic inequalities including socio-economic and gender inequalities** through actions with a long term strategy. In fact, in the interviews, several NGOs mentioned activities to promote values of equality

and non-discrimination targeting young people and children

One of the limitations mentioned in the interviews is the risk that implementation will not be done correctly, leading to undesirable competition between agencies to receive the funds. Likewise, the implementation of this approach requires enhancing coordination between the different actors, which implies increasing spaces for sharing, including those with national and local authorities, who may be reluctant to engage with more actors. One of the most relevant challenges identified to ensure effective coordination of the triple nexus is the need to strengthen and work concretely to ensure coherence and complementarity in relation to common long term objectives.

It is noteworthy that, **although all organisations are committed to the triple nexus, the general vision is clearer in the link between the humanitarian and development components and less evident in relation to the peace element.** Notwithstanding, lack of knowledge to apply the nexus approach in depth is recognised and tools are demanded to be able to promote it properly. The working mechanisms, forms, monitoring or evaluation systems that continue to be used by organisations

## **VI.VI / The humanitarian component remains central to the response**


The humanitarian response to the Venezuelan migration crisis has been characterised by not following a totally linear logic, that is, some development actions have begun to be carried out while the provision of humanitarian aid continued. This is understandable since migratory flows have been continuous since their inception, despite fluctuation. As Venezuelans continue to leave their home country and cross borders, it remains essential to maintain the humanitarian response.

However, the perception of the focus on the type of care provided is not homogeneous according to the actors involved. **It is notable that 100% of local NGOs and 79% of international NGOs claim that so far, the focus has been on attention to basic needs,** this is humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, 100% of donors consider that this has not been the case and 43% of international organisations

agree that the focus has not been on humanitarian. This shows a great disconnect between the various types of actors regarding a shared strategic vision in the response to the crisis.

One of the concerns that emerged in the interviews was the risk of generating a dependence on international humanitarian assistance. Up until now, the humanitarian response has been funded mainly by international donors and secondarily by host countries.<sup>5</sup>

**Figure 6**  
Organisations by type according to which humanitarian response remains the priority in the current situation.




Regarding the transition from humanitarian response to other types of actions, there has been a fear of moving too quickly to other type of actions without having covered basic needs. The vast majority of organisations surveyed still consider humanitarian response to remain the priority in the current situation. It is recognised, at the same time, that it is necessary not to delay too much in evolving towards development plans that engage local communities. Some targeted assistance programmes, such as cash transfer programmes, risk creating tensions with the local population leading to xenophobia.

<sup>5</sup> We lack the exact data that corroborates this statement in terms of percentages of expenditure by the various actors. Access to this economic data is not currently possible. Yet, through interviews with key actors and the bibliographic review this is our perception as researchers.

Figure 7

Priorities within the "humanitarian" component of the nexus.



Based on the survey, key priorities in humanitarian action are protection (76.6%), followed by health (74,5%), and food security (70,2%) and thus appear as the activities that organisations deem most urgent. Protection is understood as those activities aimed at ensuring that the authorities and other actors respect their obligations and the rights of individuals with a view to preserve their safety, physical integrity, and dignity in situations of violence. In this respect, the ICRC has a key role to play in dealing with the authorities by acting as a neutral intermediary in order to reduce the vulnerability of persons and their exposure to risk (ICRC, 2008).

Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that alongside classic protection approaches such as those of the ICRC based on strict neutrality dealing with the authorities, **non-governmental organisations are also adopting new methodological and operational approaches in order to ensure a comprehensive protection.** An example of this is the implementation of the Community Protection Approach (CPA). This approach, focused on protection risks and resulting needs, aims to enhance communities and local actors' capacity to make informed decisions that enable them to develop their lives in a safe and dignified manner. (WeWorld, 2021).

According to the R4V platform, the lack of documents is a pressing concern in terms of protection. Regarding health, one of the reasons behind its importance is the administrative barriers that prevent access to health services. Indeed, R4V itself recognises the need to continue humanitarian



assistance: "The RMRP 2021 strives to maintain a balance between the response focused on immediate humanitarian and protection assistance and activities that bridge the humanitarian, development and peace nexus, responding to the long term resilience and integration needs of affected populations and host communities."(R4V, 2020, p. 15)


## **VI.VII / Is it possible to solidify a greater commitment to development and integration?**

As this migration crisis has dragged on for more than five years, more and more actors have targeted a response based more on development than on the merely humanitarian element. An example of this is that **100% of the organisations surveyed for this research agreed that greater emphasis on development was required.**

The leaning towards this approach stems from the acknowledgement that the political and economic crisis within Venezuela will not have a swift solution. International organisations, local and international NGOs, and donors agree that conditions in Venezuela are not in place to even consider the return of the migrant population to their country of origin. This is reflected in priorities beyond the immediate needs defined by the organisations surveyed. For example, while measures aimed at the permanence of migrants in their host countries such as social and cultural integration score high within the priorities of medium and long term measures, **preparation for return is classified as the last priority.**

Figure 8


Medium-long term priorities.



This prioritisation in the surveys coincides with what was said by several of the organisations interviewed for this report. Some of them highlighted that, even though during the first months of the pandemic there was a greater flow of people returning to Venezuela, in 2021 it was reported that migration to other regional countries was rising again. Similarly, they argue that the return of migrants cannot be encouraged until there is a drastic political change in the country. According to organisations monitoring the situation, migrants are now bringing their relatives residing in Venezuela to their host countries. It is reported that to return is not on their plans unless they face much greater barriers in their new destinations or the Venezuelan economy improves radically.

In this sense, it seeks to implement measures aimed at the development and socio-economic integration of Venezuelan migrants in the region. Several national GTRMs have even created sub-working groups on socio-economic integration issues. According to the survey, 60% of the organisations involved in the response to the crisis have a development component within their mandate.


**Figure 9**  
Organisational mandate.



Organisations have prioritised work on projects to strengthen livelihood projects and efforts aimed at supporting the legal procedures of migrants, and in that sense, several of the interviewees highlighted that their **organisations are now more actively involved in providing training for employment, access to goods and services, or legal assistance.**

Similarly, greater emphasis is being placed by local organisations on the importance of joining forces for the regularisation of Venezuelan migrants. These initiatives are articulated together with the private sector to promote the incorporation of migrants into the formal market. Regularisation plays a key role in ensuring that migrant population have access to these services to the extent that recipient countries are middle-income and have developed sufficient infrastructure for the provision of health and education.

**Figure 10**  
**Priorities under the “development” component of the nexus.**



Despite actors acknowledging the need for development and some of them already working in this area, such an approach faces significant challenges to crystallise within the response.

First, numerous organisations interviewed highlighted the fact that it is still necessary to precisely define regularisation mechanisms schemes in the medium term. While Colombia has already taken a significant step in that respect, with the adoption of the Temporary Protection Status valid for ten years, other countries have opted for shorter-term measures that hinder the integration of migrants in their host communities. On this particular point, some organisations underscored the need **to introduce coordinated measures amongst recipient countries in order to facilitate regularisation schemes for migrants willing to settle**. For instance, it is vital to ease the obtention of documents as some migrants left Venezuela without being able to process their passports or without their identity cards. At this stage, there is some risk for the push for development action to be mistaken with purely economic, social, and cultural integration. Integration, in our view, is a necessary but not sufficient requirement to achieve sustainable human development. Additional institutional elements, such as the exercise of rights, would be required in the future.

Various organisations have put in place advocacy mechanisms for governments to move forward in **this** area, yet seldom progress has been made due to the political scenario at the regional, national,

and local levels. The arrival of new governments in Ecuador and Peru has brought changes to the narratives regarding the regularisation of migrants. Conversely, integration forums in Latin America lack the capacity to articulate coordinated and coherent policies at the regional level. At the local level, some organisations interviewed highlighted that local leaders resist regulating migrants as they respond to an increasingly xenophobic electorate that opposes these measures.

In addition, regularisation is yet the first step in a series of broader challenges to advance development initiatives. Despite most recipient countries being middle-income with health and education infrastructure, access to these rights is unequal. High rates of informal economy diminish the capacity of organisations to operate in the field of employment. According to the organisations interviewed, progress in the economic integration of migrants should encompass improving access to goods and services in host communities. **Informality represents a chronic challenge in the region yet overcoming this goes far beyond the reach of organisations responding to the migration crisis.**

Meanwhile, migrants are entering local economies, predominantly within the informal sector. Some organisations highlighted that the pervasiveness of informal employment has made it easier for irregular migrants to obtain economic resources swiftly by carrying out informal activities such as selling sweets and street food, performing domestic services, among other activities. However, this pathway can pose risks in terms of labour rights, precariousness, and exploitation. To counterbalance this trend, some organisations interviewed seek to promote social entrepreneurship, cooperatives, and solidarity economy programmes. They argue that providing alternatives to precarious employment options will enable a greater degree of sustainability of economic initiatives in the region.

Additionally, as discussed above, there is a lack of resources allocated to a long term response, which hinders the implementation of development projects. Some organisations interviewed have chosen to apply exclusively financing opportunities for more than a year to carry out deeper interventions in terms of institutional strengthening, productive projects, among others; but they argue that this is difficult given donors continue to offer the vast majority of resources for six months up a year maximum.

Along the same lines, several organisations also stressed that despite growing attention to development elements in recent years, **there is still a need for more active participation of actors focused on medium and long term development interventions.** They argue that donors continue to focus on exclusively humanitarian funding, while other actors such as the IDB or the World Bank have not yet been sufficiently involved in the response.

Finally, despite being mentioned tangentially in surveys and interviews, there is the issue of environmental considerations in the crisis response. Interviewees in countries such as Peru, Colombia and Venezuela stressed that on several occasions the migrant population has settled in areas of high vulnerability to environmental catastrophes, yet for the most part, humanitarian interventions are not taking this into account. **Underscoring the seldom concern regarding the impact that humanitarian projects may have on the environment.** As illustration, solutions to provide drinking water have disregarded the aquifer characteristics of the areas. Greater coordination among silos is therefore vital to ensure that the humanitarian response goes hand in hand with sustainable development.

## **VI.VIII / The necessary but complex inclusion of peacebuilding elements in the crisis response**


The analysis of the peace component of the triple nexus in the Venezuelan migration crisis has been one of the major struggles in this study. Mainly due to the difficulty of agreeing on what “peace” we are talking about, as well as what peace the various organisations to the survey and the interviewees were referring to. But, even acknowledging this limitation and the potential ambiguity that it may generate, some of the most surprising results of this study are precisely in this section.

Conventional proposals of the triple nexus approach (OECD-DAC, EU...), analysed above, emerge to respond to other types of contexts in which conflict, violence, post-agreement, or peace-building situations are apparent. Therefore, our initial research hypothesis was to assess the extent to which the peace component should be incorporated into the work in this crisis or if it was somewhat forced

by the predisposition of some donors. Therefore, both in the survey and the interviews we approach the subject openly, striving to not suggest or influence their answers.


The vast majority of the organisations participating in the survey consider that they work on peacebuilding.

**Figure 11**  
Organisations by type working in peacebuilding.



The survey also explored the type of actions that organisations deem a priority in this crisis and the results were rather conclusive. **The actions towards groups at risk of human rights violation, especially those related to combatting xenophobia, gathered the greatest support.** The growth of xenophobic and stigmatising attitudes with unfounded accusations of links with crime and others towards Venezuelan migrants are a cause for concern for all organisations. On certain occasions, they expressed that discrimination has elements of *aporophobia*, hostility towards poor people, since it is directed at the poorest migrants. For some organisations, such actions against xenophobia must be an essential part of integration irrespective of operating within a triple nexus approach. **The promotion of a culture of peace is seen as part of integration.** For other actors, addressing these aspects from a clearer approach to peacebuilding, violence prevention and triple nexus gives them greater added value.

**Figure 12**  
**Priorities under the "peace" component of the nexus.**



Interpretation of the peace component of the nexus in the sense of prevention and mitigation of violence especially, those derived from discrimination, stigmatisation, or xenophobia, was predominant during the interviews. Most interviewees embrace a broad vision of what peacebuilding entails in line with a "Galtungian" vision of peace<sup>6</sup> as absence of structural and cultural violence and not only of direct violence. In this respect, some organisations interviewed add a comprehensive spiritual, supportive and healing dimension to it. They also suggest that actions against xenophobia or exclusion should be linked to protection tasks.

Special mention should be made to peace matters in the context of the migrant population in Colombia as the country in its own process to eradicate violence. A complex situation persists in various territories, hence the arrival of a large number of migrants from Venezuela may bring additional complications. Potential risks span from enrollment by armed groups has been mentioned, particularly at the borders to recruitment for production or trafficking of illicit goods. In

<sup>6</sup> Based on Johan Galtung's theory regarding the different types of violence.



an already complex context due to the Colombian conflict, the migrant population may be particularly vulnerable to these situations. In some regions, the dynamics of violence have been altered by the arrival of the Venezuelan population. In some interviews, ideas such as "the link between development and humanitarian is simple but when adding peace becomes more complex. There is natural coordination on the issue of internal displacement through the *back to back* and at the local level, but in any case, a large part of the migrant population is in urban areas relatively far from the conflict." Sarcastically, an interviewee expressed that "in Colombia, it is easier to talk about migration than armed conflict".

There is a fairly widespread view that in a crisis with root causes as complex and multiple as the Venezuelan, getting directly involved in peace issues can pose risks to the performance and image of organisations as it entails a certain level of politicisation of their action. This was especially emphasised by humanitarian organisations that expressed caution in this regard to guard against bias or manipulation. One interviewee stated that "work on peace issues must be handled with care due to the impact on the public perception of the humanitarian response and the resistance of political actors in Venezuela."

On the other hand, **some interviewees inquired whether the nexus approach and its peace component, should also begin to operate within Venezuela** as a mechanism to reconcile opposing social groups and build citizenship around a culture of peace.

Along these lines, several interventions touched upon **how working on the peace element requires previous expertise and the management of tools that minimise possible risks** (such as the "do no harm" approach) **on the part of organisations**. Also, including from the beginning of the planning issues of peace and conflict sensitivity, consistent with all actions.

Despite the organisations' sensitivity to direct their work towards peacebuilding, understood in broad terms, and the progress made in adopting a triple nexus approach, it is still not enough. It would be necessary to plan this component in a more specific and coherent way with the humanitarian and development aspects. One of the opportunities and potential advantages of the nexus approach is to plan from the onset the three components in a coherent, coordinated, and complementary way, promoting common objectives and results, which has not happened in this crisis.

## VII / CONCLUSIONS

Based on what has been presented, we collect below some relevant conclusions from the study:

1. **All organisations believe that the response to the Venezuelan migration crisis should be planned in the long term**, but there are several obstacles to achieving it. 70% of local NGOs do not incorporate a long term vision into their programmes, yet the vast majority consider it to be the right approach to cope with migration flows.
2. Instruments put in place to respond to the crisis, namely financing mechanisms, are not adapted to the needs of the situation. The duration of these mechanisms is usually periods between three months and a year. The rigidity of these instruments prevents adaptation to changes in the situation.
3. Coordination mechanisms have been strengthened over time and greatly improved in terms of information and joint planning. However, from a HDP-nexus standpoint, they have shortcomings with regard to the definition of common objectives and outcomes, particularly in the peace element.
4. The incorporation of recipient states and local and diaspora organisations into coordination mechanisms is still a challenge due to considerations of the risk that their participation entails in terms of neutrality and impartiality. However, there is a widespread perception that it is increasingly necessary to involve these actors as the crisis drags on for years.
5. **Humanitarian assistance continues to be critical** to respond to the needs of the Venezuelan migrant population. Most organisations believe that this cannot be ignored as long as the migratory flow continues, and new migrants and refugees in transit continue to be exposed to violations and threats.

6. **The triple nexus approach is considered to be a suitable approach to the crisis, but there are challenges to actively putting it into action.** Among these, the lack of knowledge about the implications and implementation of such an approach by most organisations, especially by local organisations, stands out. The peace component appears as the element needing more clarity in terms of its scope and implications. Likewise, the absence of coordination mechanisms to organise the programmes and activities of the actors of the three areas in a coherent and complementary manner has been identified.
7. **The unlikeness of migrants returning to Venezuela in the medium term has led actors to support initiatives focused on development and socio-economic integration** of the migrant population in the host communities. This decision brought in challenges in terms of legalisation of migratory status in several countries of the region and incorporation of migrants in markets where informality and precariousness prevail. The lack of access to long term resources impedes working more decisively towards development measures.
8. **Integration, as it is being conceived today by most agencies, is an indispensable but not sufficient requirement in development work.** Incorporating the migrant population in sustainable human development plans requires institutional, financial, legal elements, etc. that equalise and protect their rights.

Despite the peace component being less evident in this crisis, most organisations consider it **relevant**. They approach it from a rationale of combating xenophobia and mitigating possible manifestations of violence against the migrant population. In addition to this, it is the promotion of a culture of peace.

## VIII / RECOMMENDATIONS

Along the same line, we provide the following recommendations:

1. **Establish medium and long term planning frameworks** addressing the response to the Venezuelan migration crisis in a more comprehensive manner that set out common objectives and measurable results. This implies incorporating into the organisational countries' strategies for the integration of the Venezuelan population into the host communities, as well as development plans that also take into account the local population.
2. **Improve the articulation between development and peace while maintaining their autonomy** and seeking potential synergies and added values. This coordination has to be context sensitive. In the case of Colombia, peace actions are a fundamental aspect. The need to continue humanitarian assistance cannot be an obstacle to development and peace actions.
3. **Advance towards the ownership of public and local entities and civil society in the response** to the Venezuelan migration crisis. This implies that these local actors are not only involved in the implementation, but also more active in drafting strategic plans and in the establishment of common objectives. Likewise, their participation in coordination mechanisms led by international entities should be encouraged.
4. **Guarantee the migrant population's leadership in the response at each stage** in the issues that affect them, being aware of the diversity of people that make up this group and the pre-existing inequalities of power. It is essential to support women's, LGTBIQ+ and ethnic minority organisations since their demands and life experiences are different. Their demands run the risk of being relegated if they are not taken into account from the planning stage.
5. **Explore funding frameworks by donor agencies that will allow organisations to work with greater flexibility and adaptability** in the view of evolving situations. Extending the funding

time frames to multi-year budgets would be essential. Both the DAC, the EU and the Red Cross Movement have drafted recommendations to promote this type of instrument. Funding mechanisms should allow for better articulation of humanitarian, development, and peace elements. Flexibility in the funds would ensure that resources can be allocated to those priorities identified according to the evolution of the context. At the same time, it ensures that budgets aimed at humanitarian action are kept apart from those used for development and peace activities.

6. **Continue to encourage the greater inclusion of host communities** in financing and strengthen their relationship with the Venezuelan migrant population (through comprehensive development activities) to promote integration and mitigate the rejection and xenophobia to which they are exposed.
7. **Produce a compilation of best practices in the implementation of the triple nexus** as a way of showing the practical value of the approach and the implementation mechanisms. This guide would include the need to adapt these practices through a contextualised and conscious vision of local realities.
8. **Leverage the adoption of the triple nexus and long term vision to encompass objectives aimed at combating pre-existing inequalities**, including gender, ethnic-racial, disability, religion, age, gender identity and sexual orientation, and systemic barriers in both the host and migrant populations. This point requires adopting a human rights approach, aware of the local context, in all activities carried out.
9. **Analyse the environmental impact of triple nexus activities:** humanitarian action, peace, and development, and incorporate measures to address the vulnerability to climate change of local communities, having in mind that many areas of the region are already being affected by its effects. This also involves including disaster risk reduction plans in all programming.

10. **Systematise and share knowledge on solidarity economy initiatives and cooperatives among regional countries.** It is imperative to promote better development responses in markets characterised by informality and precariousness. This implies that the plans take into account the gender impact on informal labour and the care economy.
  
11. **Incorporate the use of specific tools of “do no harm” or conflict sensitivity in peace activities and across the board.** This approach requires some expertise; hence training should be promoted, and comprehensive guidelines included in the inventory of good practices.
  
12. **Consider the regional migration crisis** when drafting plans aimed at the Venezuelan migrant population and move towards strategies that include the different migration flows.
  
13. **Urge host countries to set up regularisation schemes for the Venezuelan migrant population in a homogeneous manner.** The status of administrative irregularity prevents them from accessing essential services including health and education and exposes them to situations of abuse and exploitation. The non-recognition of their presence in the country thwarts the protection of their rights.
  
14. **Continue the political dialogue to tackle this migration crisis,** dialogue must be present at all levels, both in international forums and at the national and local level.

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## X / ANNEX

### X.I / Semi-structured interview Script

#### 1. Overall assessment of the crisis response to date

How do you think work has evolved in crisis response? Do you think there has been a logical evolution based on changes in the situation? (Do not suggest. Take note of expressions...)

What aspects has your organisation focused on the most?

What strengths and problems would you highlight as the most relevant in the actions that have been carried out so far? (summarised). Ask them about two strengths or opportunities and two limitations or weaknesses.

#### 2. Relevance of incorporating a medium-long term approach

Given the current context (to face multiple and complex challenges: permanent change, uncertainties, exacerbation or not of the crisis ...) What is relevant and why should a more decisive medium-term vision be incorporated?

Has your organisation raised or is your organisation considering this question, and are there any documents or positions that make this explicit?

What assumptions is your organisation addressing in the medium term? Focusing on economic, social, and cultural integration? Considering other elements such as possible return or migration to another country? Other approaches?

#### 3. The triple nexus approach and its usefulness or not in this crisis

Do you know the proposal of the triple nexus approach? Do you have any opinion about it?

Is this approach known and/or used in your organisation in other crises? Can you give an example?

Do you think that the nexus may be an appropriate approach to this crisis?

#### 4. Delving into the components of the nexus

*As we have seen before, the response so far has revolved around meeting basic needs and*

*humanitarian. How do you see the relationship with the other two components, development, and peace?*

*Within the "humanitarian" component of the nexus, what activities do you consider to be priorities?*

*Within the "development" component of the nexus, what activities do you consider to be priorities?*

The development aspects are the most obvious. Try to delve into those that have to do with integration, but also in others that may arise.

*Within the "peace" component of the nexus, what activities do you consider to be priorities?*

## **5. Other**

*Are there issues that we have not addressed or that you would like to emphasise? Feel free to be open on this point.*

## X.II / Survey questionnaire

QUESTIONS	OPTIONS ANSWERS
1. Name of the NGO/OSC	(Text box)
2. Country of the headquarters responding to the survey	Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Other (Text box)
3. City	(Text box)
4. Name of the person compiling the questionnaire	(Text box)
5. Position of the person compiling the questionnaire	(Text box)
6. Country or countries in which the organisation operates	Colombia; Peru; Ecuador; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Venezuela; Other (Text Box)
7. Mission and vision of the NGO/CSO.	(Text box)
8. Participation in NGO/CSO coordination mechanisms	Humanitarian Network; GTRM; Other (Text Box)
9. Is the office a decentralised headquarters of an international NGO/CSO?	Yes; No
10. Does the NGO/CSO have any projects with international partners?	Yes; No
11. What is the mandate of the Organisation?	Development; Humanitarian Aid/Emergency, Other (Text Box)
12. Does your organisation work on peacebuilding?	Yes; No
13. What are the target populations of your organisation?	Internally displaced persons; Women; Men; Childhood; Seniors; Persons with disabilities; Migrant population; Indigenous; LGBTI population; Afro-descendant population; No specific population; Other (Text Box)

<p>14. In relation to the Venezuelan migration crisis, what issues has your organisation focused on? Multiple choice question (maximum 3)</p>	<p>Emergency humanitarian response; Protection of rights; Work with specific groups; Social, economic, and cultural integration; Medium- and long term development aspects; Sectoral issues</p>
<p>15. Has your organisation incorporated a medium-long term approach to this crisis?</p>	<p>Yes; No</p>
<p>16. If the answer is yes, can you include a link to any document to this effect?</p>	<p>(Text box)</p>
<p>17. From 1 to 5, with 1 being the least important and 5 being the highest, assess the priority of the following actions in a medium- long term approach for the population Venezuelan migrant and refugee *</p>	<p>Protection of rights; Social integration; Character projects productive economy; Training and training; Education; Prevention of violent conflict; Humanitarian care; Cultural integration; Preparation for return; Sectoral assistance; Policy advocacy public; Actions that promote the construction of the peace; Strengthening of the migrant or refugee organisations</p>
<p>18. The Venezuelan crisis must be addressed with a long term vision since an improvement in the situation does not seem likely. Do you agree?</p>	<p>Yes; No</p>
<p>19. Humanitarian response remains the priority in the current situation. Are you from agreement?</p>	<p>Yes; No</p>
<p>20. More development issues need to be incorporated into all actions in this crisis. Do you agree?</p>	<p>Yes; No</p>

<p>21. Up until now, the focus has been on meeting needs Basic. Do you agree?</p>	<p>Yes; No</p>
<p>22. Does your organisation know the triple nexus understood as the interrelationships between humanitarian, development, and construction actions peace. This involves making efforts with a view to strengthen collaboration, the coherence and complementarity (3C) between the different mandates?</p>	<p>Yes; No</p>
<p>23. Do you think it is an appropriate approach to the Venezuelan crisis?</p>	<p>Yes; No</p>
<p>24. Explain your reasoning</p>	<p><i>(Text box)</i></p>
<p>25. The triple nexus seeks to incorporate development, peace, and humanitarian action in a coherent manner. Within the "peace" component of the nexus, what activities do you consider to be priorities? Rate from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least important and 5 the largest.</p>	<p>Actions to promote integration in host communities; Training and education for conflict resolution of both migrants as well as host population; Activities to combat xenophobia; Prevention of violence against the migrant population; Coexistence actions; Actions towards the groups at risk of human rights violations (affected by gender-based violence, children...)</p>
<p>26. Other "peace" activities that you consider to be priorities</p>	<p><i>(Text box)</i></p>
<p>27. Within the "development" component of the nexus, what activities do you consider to be priorities? Value from 1 to 5, Value from 1 to 5, being 1 the least important and 5 the largest.</p>	<p>Training in productive projects; Projects to strengthen livelihoods; Medium-term food security; Multipurpose Monetary assistance; Accommodation; Support in legal procedures</p>

28. Other "development" activities that you consider to be priorities	<i>(Text box)</i>
29. Within the "humanitarian" component of the nexus, what activities do you consider? Priority? Rate from 1 to 5	Food security; Health; Water, sanitation, hygiene (WASH); Protection; Education; Humanitarian transport; Monetary assistance
30. Other "humanitarian" activities that you consider to be priorities	<i>(Text box)</i>





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