


CONSOLIDATED ENTRIES AND EXITS OF VENEZUELAN FROM JANUARY - MARCH 2024



SOURCES:

1) Dominican Republic: Regular entries and exits of Venezuelans by air.

Source: [Central Bank of the Dominican Republic](#)

2) Costa Rica: The figure corresponds to the number of Venezuelan regular and irregular entries by air and land reported for the period covered by this report. The estimate of irregular Venezuelan entries was calculated using DGME data on all nationalities and the SNM proportion of Venezuelans crossing the Darien.

Platform estimates based on General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners (DGME) and [Panama National Migration Service \(SNM\)](#).

Source: General Directorate of Migration and Foreigners (DGME)

3) Panama: Regular and irregular entries and exits of Venezuelans by air and land.

Source for irregular and regular entries and exits of Venezuelans: [Panama National Migration Service \(SNM\)](#)

4) Colombia: Regular and irregular entries and exits of Venezuelans by air, land, and sea borders.

For data on regular entries, see: [Migración Colombia](#)

The information on irregular movements on all borders -except Panama- corresponds to records from the [SIRE information system and](#)

[the Safe Transit app](#). Exits to Panama are retrieved from the [Panama National Migration Service](#).

5) Ecuador: Regular and irregular entries and exits of Venezuelans by air and land.

Source for regular entries and exits: [Ministry of Interior Ecuador](#)
Source for irregular entries and exits: GTRM Border Monitoring and [Population Profiling System](#) triangulated with GTRM Peru irregular movement estimates.

6) Peru: Regular and irregular entries and exits of Venezuelans by air, land and sea borders.

Source for regular entries and exits: Superintendence of Migration of Peru.

Source for irregular entries and exits: [DTM Flow Monitoring Registry in Tacna, Tumbes and Puno](#) and UNHCR border monitoring in Madre de Dios, triangulated with [GTRM Ecuador irregular movement estimates](#)

Note: Monitoring exercises by R4V partners in Puno were temporarily suspended there in July 2023, due to social and political events within Peru.

7) Chile: Regular entries and exits in all borders, and estimated irregular movements to/from Peru and Bolivia.
Source for regular entries and exits: Investigations Police of Chile (PDI), data upon request.

Source for irregular entries and exits in the borders with Bolivia and Peru: IOM DTMs in the border points of [Pisiga/Colchane](#), and [Tacna/Arica](#).

8) Brazil: Regular entries and exits of Venezuelans at all points.

Source: [Brazilian Federal Police's International Traffic System](#).

9) Paraguay: Regular entries and exits.

Source: National Migration Directorate of Paraguay.

10) Bolivia: Regular entries and exits in all borders and irregular flows in the borders with Peru and Chile.

Source for regular entries and exits: National Migration Directorate of Bolivia (DIGEMIG).

Source for irregular flows: IOM DTMs in the border points with [Peru \(Desaguadero\)](#) and [Chile \(Pisiga/Colchane\)](#).

11) Argentina: Regular entries and exits.

Source: National Migration Directorate of Argentina.

12) Uruguay: Regular entries and exits.

Source: National Migration Directorate of Uruguay.

Due to differences in methodology, geographic coverage of data collection, and availability of official statistics from the authorities, movements data from different countries may include variations and must be considered estimations.

Quarterly figures included throughout this document correspond to cumulative entry and exit movements during the months of January through March of the year and do not represent a count of unique individuals.

[1] The temporary reduction in Venezuelan refugees and migrants engaging in northward movements via the Darien jungle in late 2022 and early 2023 was due to the expiry of the U.S. COVID-era policy known as Title 42 (see [R4V Movements Report: Fourth Quarter 2022](#)).



MOVEMENTS REPORT

JANUARY - MARCH 2024

REGIONAL TRENDS AND KEY FINDINGS

The first months of 2024 saw a continuation of trends observed in 2023. Despite the dangers and risks associated with crossing high-altitudes, deserts, jungles and open seas, and prevailing visa and entry restrictions, irregular transit movements remain central to the situation of refugees and migrants across the Latin America and Caribbean. Additionally, the first quarter of the year also confirmed the trend of northward movements of refugees and migrants from Venezuela and of other nationalities. According to the National Migration Service (SNM) of Panama, 110,000 individuals (64% of them Venezuelans) crossed the Darien jungle and continued their journey in search of better opportunities and safety.

While the end of the year typically sees an increase in movement towards Venezuela, the beginning of the year is usually marked a renewed increase in outflows from Venezuela, with refugees and migrants returning to their host countries or embarking on new journeys after the end-year festivities. This annual trend was also visible during the first quarter of 2024, with movements to Venezuela from neighbouring countries remaining relatively stable compared to the previous quarter. Compared to the same period of 2023, Colombia and Brazil observed an increase in exits to Venezuela (in the case of Brazil, an increase of 16%²). Although surveys among those already undertaking such return movements (at the borders with Venezuela) suggest that they have an intention to either temporarily or permanently return to Venezuela, border monitoring data from Colombia and Brazil in Q1 2024 indicates a slight increase in the number of those intending to remain in Venezuela. In Brazil, this percentage rose from 11% to 17% during the last quarter. Similarly, in Colombia, some 81% of those already engaging in such


return movements [reported](#) that they had no plans to leave Venezuela following their return (compared to 75% in Q4 2023 and 68% in Q3 2023).

Amidst a climate of increasing insecurity in various parts of the country and corresponding declarations of a [state of exception](#) and of an [internal armed conflict by the government of Ecuador in January 2024](#), increasing departures of refugees and migrants have been observed. According to Ecuador's Ministry of Interior data on [regular exits of Ecuadorian nationals](#), the overall negative migratory balance of Ecuadorians was nearly double in Q1 of 2024 (-71,437), compared to the same time period in 2023 (-35,507), with the main departing points being international airports (Quito and Guayaquil) and the land borders with Peru (Huaquillas) and Colombia (Rumichaca).

Several countries in the region faced extreme weather events, attributed to the El Niño weather phenomenon and other climate change factors. Wildfires ravaged across major cities of Chile and Colombia, resulting in the destruction of thousands of homes and loss of lives. In Chile, where [135 persons lost their lives](#), it also marked the largest disaster since the 2010 earthquake. On the other hand, Ecuador and Peru experienced heavy rainfalls, flooding and landslides, resulting in largescale loss of livelihoods and damage to critical infrastructure. In Peru, these events also contributed to dengue outbreaks in border regions with Ecuador and Brazil. Overall, such extreme weather events prompted the internal relocation of people in affected areas, contributing to refugees and migrants engaging in onward movements and impacting the conditions for in-transit populations, who often have to resort to sleeping in streets or parks.

[2] Data on regular exits from Brazil (Brazilian Federal Police's International Traffic System), comparing Q1 2023 and Q1 2024.

REGULAR ENTRIES AND EXITS OF ECUADORIANS TO AND FROM ECUADOR



Sources:

[Ministry of Interior, Ecuador](#)

NORTHWARD MOVEMENTS THROUGH CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO

The sub-region continues to be characterized by large-scale transit movements of refugees and migrants, the vast majority intending to reach the United States of America (U.S.). While 2023 set a new record in the number of people who crossed into **Panama** through the Darien jungle (more than doubling the number of crossings of the previous year), the Ministry of Public Security of Panama anticipates a further [increase by up to 20% in the number of irregular entries in 2024](#). In line with this projection, data from Panama's [SNM](#) indicates that between January and March 2024, more than 110,000 people crossed the Darien (including 70,100 Venezuelans, 9,000 Ecuadorians, 7,300 Haitians, 7,100 Colombians and 6,400 Chinese), exceeding the number of irregular entries during the same period in 2023 by 26%. While Venezuelans still represent the vast majority (64%), it's notable that the number of Colombians using this route (7,100 in Q1 2024) more than tripled compared to the same period last year (2,200 in [Q1 2023](#)). According to the [Office of the Ombudsperson in Colombia](#), the outflow of Colombians would be owed to a "search for job opportunities and family reunification, and [...], due to the violence and insecurity caused by the armed conflict and organized crime."

Despite the temporary [suspension of maritime transportation](#) of refugees and migrants in Turbo and Necocli, Colombia, in late February (see Colombia section for more information) and a [fire at the San Vicente temporary reception centre](#) (ETRM) in the Darien on 1 March, the rate of these irregular entries to Panama remained consistently high throughout the quarter (January: 36,000, February: 37,200, March: 36,800).

To prevent a concentration of people at the border, as reported in [Q4 2023](#), the governments of Panama and **Costa Rica** began facilitating direct private bus transportation from the ETRM in Darien to the migration station (EMISUR) in Paso Canoas in Costa Rica in October 2023. Owing to the general intention of in-transit populations to continue their journeys northward, coupled with limited opportunities for refugees and migrants to remain in Costa Rica, the number of entries and trends identified in both Panama and Costa Rica is considered to be aligned. Upon arrival at the EMISUR, refugees and migrants are able to access bus transportation to the border with Nicaragua, where they are required to pay an entry fee of USD150 to cross the border from Costa Rica.

MAIN ROUTES USED BY REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN THE SUB-REGION




In **Mexico**, the movement dynamics continued to reflect those in Panama and Costa Rica, both in terms of the continued high numbers of individuals in-transit as well as concerning security risks along the routes. During the reporting period, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) recorded around 555,500 encounters at the Southwest border with Mexico, 7% of which (36,900) were Venezuelans. This is a significant decrease from the previous quarters (132,800 encounters with Venezuelans in Q4 2023 and 117,000 in Q3 2023), which can at least in part be attributed to [efforts by Mexican authorities](#) to reduce access by refugees and migrants to the U.S. border. Overall, encounters with Venezuelans were 60% less in Q1 of 2024, compared to the same period last year (23,000).³

As reported in [Q4 2023](#), there are growing concerns regarding the security context in Mexico for in-transit populations, including incidents of kidnappings and extorsions by organized criminal groups. Kidnappings and other security issues were reported throughout the first three months of the year,⁴ particularly in the northern cities of Matamoros and Reynosa, as well as in Tabasco near the southern border crossing points and shelters. In addition to long waiting times for CBP One appointments (according to partners [monitoring reports](#), up to five months), security concerns within shelters and settlements may contribute to people continuing their transit irregularly.


[3] The temporary reduction in Venezuelan refugees and migrants engaging in northward movements and subsequent encounters at the U.S. border in late 2022 and early 2023 was due to the expiry of the U.S. Covid-era policy known as Title 42 (see [R4V Movements Report: Fourth Quarter 2022](#)).

[4] Examples include: <https://www.wola.org/analysis/kidnapping-migrants-asylum-seekers-texas-tamaulipas-border-intolerable-levels/> and <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-68816029>

IRREGULAR ENTRIES OF VENEZUELANS TO PANAMA VIA THE DARIEN JUNGLE



Monthly proportion of Venezuelan and Ecuadorian nationals among total irregular entries to Panama



Notes:

It is estimated that approximately 70.5% of the Venezuelan entries observed in the last quarter correspond to irregular flows. In addition to the irregular figures showcased in the graph, [SNM](#) reports a cumulative figure of 29.4 K regular entries and 24.0 K regular exits of Venezuelans in Q1 2024.

Source:


[Panama National Migration Service](#)

Following the suspension of registration appointment slips to asylum-seekers in October 2023 by the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR), additional requirements were introduced for asylum-seekers on 1

March 2024. To prevent “abandonment” and subsequent closure of cases of those transiting the country, asylum-seekers are now required to present themselves on a weekly basis to the National Migration Institute (INM)

or COMAR. During the first quarter of 2024, the overall [number of asylum claims](#) filed in Mexico decreased by approximately 37% from the same period last year (23,800 in Q1 2024 and 37,900 in Q1 2023), with

Venezuelan asylum claims accounting for around 7% during the first three months of the year. The impact of the new measures remains to be confirmed.




In terms of **motivations and intentions**, R4V partner [surveys](#) across the countries of the sub-region found that the primary reason for leaving the country of origin or a previous host country remained the lack of access to employment (68% among those leaving the country of origin and 69% of those leaving a host country). For respondents who came directly from their country of origin (some 40% of Venezuelans crossing the Darien),

other significant reasons for leaving included violence and security (55%) and access to food (40%). Among respondents leaving a previous host country, lack of documentation (27%) and violence and security (22%) were also highlighted as important push factors. Nearly three in five Venezuelans (58%) had applied for a regular status in a previous country of residence; 27% reported having valid documentation from that

country. Another partner [survey](#) in the Darien found that the main motivations for leaving varied depending on the respondents' nationality. Economic reasons were identified as a push factor among all respondents (99% of Venezuelans, 94% of Ecuadorians and 97% of Colombians), prevailing insecurity and violence, as well as political reasons were highlighted as additional factors among Ecuadorian (83% and 6% respectively) and Venezuelan respondents (46% and 14%, respectively). Similar results were found in Costa Rica, where an R4V [partner's flow monitoring](#) in March found that 98% of surveyed individuals in-transit indicated that the main reasons for leaving was the search for more favourable economic conditions, followed by the search for more favourable work conditions (93%), political stability (41%),

access to asylum (41%), and family reunification (17%). The U.S. remains the intended destination for some 95% of respondents.

While strict visa and entry requirements impede regular access for a majority, all three countries of the sub-region continue to record regular entries and exits of Venezuelans (almost entirely via international airports). While the reasons for this are yet to be investigated, compared to the same period last year, in comparison to the same period of 2023, regular entries of Venezuelans to Mexico and Panama decreased by 47% and 21%, respectively, while the number of those arriving to Costa Rica increased by 43% during the first quarter of 2024 (from 2,600 in Q1 2023 to 3,800 in Q1 2024).



During the reporting period, 150 deportations were reported by Panama's [National Migration Service](#) (SNM), including 120 for irregular entry into the country. Among other nationalities, this included 99 Colombians and 27 Venezuelans.


While no deportations took place in Mexico during the reporting period, the Mexican government signed an [agreement](#) with Venezuela to deport Venezuelans under its '*Vuelta a la patria*' programme. To incentivize the returns, the Mexican government will provide

Venezuelans in Mexico with a monthly grant of around USD 110 for a period of six months, offer employment options in Mexico, and [support employment opportunities in Venezuela](#), which are to be determined.

In terms of voluntary returns, SNM reported [536 voluntary returns](#) taking place from Panama during the reporting

period, including 276 Colombians, 131 Venezuelans, 44 Nicaraguans, 28 Salvadorans and 11 Chinese. In Mexico, [429 voluntary returns](#) of Venezuelans were reported between January and February, including 8 children.

MULTI-DIRECTIONAL MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AMERICA



COLOMBIA


In Colombia, according to data from *Migracion Colombia*, a decrease was observed in the number of entries of Venezuelan refugees and migrants at the Colombia-Ecuador border compared to the previous quarter. The decrease in entries from Ecuador could partially be attributed to seasonal factors (as the end of the year is usually characterized by a temporary increase in

movements towards Venezuela, which slows down at the beginning of the new year). It may also be related to [enhanced border controls](#) undertaken by the Colombian National Army at formal and informal crossings along the border, in response to rising insecurity in neighbouring Ecuador.

Meanwhile, despite the internal situation in Ecuador, exits from Colombia to Ecuador increased compared to the last quarter. Similar to the entry trends, this likely relates to seasonal factors, implying a relative decrease in exits from Colombia to Ecuador at the end of the year and a renewed increase in southward movement at the beginning of the year.

[criminal record certificate](#) from their country or origin or country of residence, adding another obstacle to enter the country regularly. As a result, and according to *Migración Colombia*, irregular exits accounted for 81% of all exits from Colombia to Ecuador during the first quarter of the year.

Separately, according to a ministerial agreement issued by the government of Ecuador, all foreigners entering from Colombia and Peru must present an [apostilled](#)




At the Colombia-Venezuela border, *Migracion Colombia* data indicates that exits to Venezuela (regular and irregular) between January and March continued to increase compared to the previous quarter. In parallel, a slight decrease was observed in the number of entries in Q1 of 2024, compared to Q4 of 2023, which corresponds to the annual trend. Similarly to the Colombia-Ecuador border, refugees and migrants from Venezuela primarily opted for irregular departures to Venezuela, representing 62% of the all exits.

According to a [partner's monitoring survey](#), 81% of the Venezuelans interviewed at the border leaving Colombia to Venezuela indicated that they had no plans to leave Venezuela for a third country following their return. This represents an increase compared to previous survey

results in Q4 2023, when 75% indicated not having plans to leave their country of origin following the return, and 68% in Q3 2023.

Lastly, departures to Panama from Necoclí and Turbo remained consistently high during the first three months of the year, as refugees and migrants (from Venezuela and of other nationalities) continued to embark on northward journeys. The number of refugees and migrants exiting Colombia for Panama (110,008 persons, see the above section on Central America and Mexico) remained high despite a [temporary suspension of boat transport services](#) at the ports in Necoclí and Turbo between 25-29 February, which left more than 3,000 people temporarily stranded while awaiting transportation.

ECUADOR



The movement of refugees and migrants to, from and within Ecuador was influenced by several factors, including prevailing violence and insecurity, as well as environmental and climate-related disasters.


While the estimated number of entries of Venezuelans to Ecuador remained similar to the same time period in 2023 (89,400 entries in Q1 2024 compared to 93,400 entries in Q1 2023), the number of exits surpassed those of the corresponding period in 2023. Throughout the first quarter of the year, an estimated 86,600 exits were recorded, compared to 64,900 exits during the same period in 2023. This increasing trend of population outflows from Ecuador (affecting Venezuelans and other refugees and migrants, as well as Ecuadorian nationals) was corroborated by R4V partners operating in the border areas and comes against a background of the government's January 2024 declaration of a [state of exception](#) and of an [internal armed conflict](#), as well as surging levels of xenophobia.

[Heavy rains, flooding and landslides](#) affected various coastal provinces of the country during the reporting period, contributing to internal movements of the local population, refugees and migrants, and creating a new push factor, especially for those who lost their livelihoods and homes.

In line with previous quarters' trends, a majority of the irregular departures of Venezuelan refugees and migrants occurred via Ecuador's northern border (45,200 exits to the north vs. 31,500 exits to the south).

In an effort to regularize Venezuelans in an irregular situation in Ecuador, by end-March, the Government of Ecuador, has issued 93,400 VIRTE visas and 72,300 Ecuadorian IDs to Venezuelans through its registration and regularization process (scheduled to close on 5 April). An additional 248,400 had a registration appointment and 201,700 had received a certificate of temporary stay.

PERU



MAIN ROUTES USED BY REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN SOUTH AMERICA



CROSSING POINT	MOVEMENT DIRECTION	QUARTERLY IRREGULAR CROSSINGS
1 Tumbes / Huaquillas	From Peru to Ecuador - North From Ecuador to Peru - South	38.0K - 40.7K 25.8K - 31.5K
2 Desaguadero / Puno	From Bolivia to Peru - Northwest From Peru to Bolivia - Southeast	5.2K - 5.3K 6.2K - 6.3K
3 Tacna/ Arica	From Chile to Peru - North From Peru to Chile - South	13.3K - 14.0K 8.8K - 9.5K
4 Colchane / Pisiga	From Chile to Bolivia - Northeast From Bolivia to Chile - Southwest	4.0K - 4.1K 9.7K - 9.8K

Several factors influenced the movement of refugees and migrants in Peru during the first quarter of the year. This included seasonally motivated travel, with many individuals returning to their host countries after temporary visits to their country of origin. Moreover, policy changes in neighbouring countries and climate change-related events, such as flooding in border areas, also affected entry and exit trends.

The first quarter of 2024 affirmed a trend, observed throughout 2023, of more exits of refugees and migrants than arrivals to Peru. Compared to the same period in 2023, the total entries recorded over the first three months of 2024 were 27% lower. This decline may be attributed to the strengthened border control and surveillance measures (as previously reported in Q4 2023 and Q3 2023), as well as the limited regularization options available for newly arriving foreigners after the end of the regularization process in November 2023.

The most significant decrease in entries was observed in Desaguadero/Puno where entries decreased by 44% compared to the previous quarter. According to a partner's survey,⁵ and consistent with findings in 2023, Desaguadero and Madre de Dios remain the main border points through which extracontinental refugees and migrants enter Peru (15% of all entries to Desaguadero in Q1).

Meanwhile the borders in the north (Tumbes) and south (Tacna) saw only subtle changes compared to the previous quarter. While irregular entries increased by some 7% in Tumbes, the irregular exits continued to outnumber the entries.⁶ In addition to the mentioned increased border control measures, this may also be attributed to a declaration of a [state of emergency](#) for various northern provinces by the government of Peru on 10 January 2024 (in response to the surge in violence in neighbouring Ecuador). This measure grants the national police and armed forces further authority to conduct surveillance and controls at border points, initially until 10 March. With the new entry requirement for Ecuador (requiring criminal record certificates for foreigners entering from Peru or Colombia) taking effect, many Venezuelans in Peru had to return to Tumbes to obtain

these certificates, each approximately costing USD 23⁷, before continuing their journey northwards.

Overall movement trends through Tacna, at the border with Chile, also remained similar to the previous quarter. Among refugees and migrants from Venezuela interviewed at the border,⁸ a majority of whom had initiated their travel in Chile, 71% indicated that Venezuela was their intended destination, mainly due to difficulties making a living in Chile or to visit family members in their country of origin. While Ecuador was indicated as the intended destination of 10% of surveyed Venezuelans in the previous quarter, due to the social and political context in Ecuador, it was not mentioned by any of the respondents as a destination country in the first quarter of 2024.

Exits in the first quarter of the year also remained generally lower compared to the previous quarter (12% lower). This is likely linked to the end of the holiday season and an additional increase in exit movements in Q4. Nevertheless, opposite to this trend, the number of refugees and migrants exiting through the Madre de Dios border increased by 60%. This may be attributed to the heavy rains and the direct consequences of the flooding in Madre de Dios. At the end of February, the Ministry of Health declared a state of emergency, including in Tumbes and Madre de Dios, due to a significant increase in dengue cases (over 65% more than the same time period in 2023⁹). According to R4V partners' surveys¹⁰, three-quarters of the people interviewed upon exit through Madre de Dios indicated that they were seeking health services in Brazil. The health service needs in Madre de Dios surged since the district's only [health centre had been flooded](#) following the heavy rains.

The recent enactment of [Law No. 21.655](#) in neighbouring Chile (for further details, refer to the Chile section), may have implications for individuals exiting Peru for Chile. While no direct impact was yet observed on exit movements to Chile, given that border monitoring exercises¹¹ in Tacna and Puno showed that 12% of those intending to reach Chile had the intention of seeking asylum upon arrival, the impact of this provision on southward movements is subject to future monitoring.

[5] IOM, DTM Flow Monitoring Survey in Desaguadero, Q1 2024

[6] IOM, DTM Flow Monitoring Survey in Tumbes, Q1 2024

[7] The cost of the [certificate of criminal](#) record is 52.80 soles (equivalent to 14 USD) and the [apostille seal](#) is 31 soles (equivalent to 8 USD).

[8] IOM, DTM Flow Monitoring Survey in Tacna, Q1 2024.

[9] According to the Ministry of Health, in the first three months of 2023 there were 3,872 confirmed cases of dengue, and for the same period in 2024, there have been 11,228 dengue cases. <https://www.dge.gob.pe/sala-situacional-dengue/#grafico01>


[10] UNHCR, HIAS, and Caritas, Border Protection Monitoring.

[11] Border Protection Monitoring conducted by UNHCR, HIAS and Caritas in Tacna, Puno, Madre de Dios and Tumbes from 01 January to 31 March 2024 to analyze the profile, needs, vulnerabilities and risks of people interviewed in streets, parks, bus terminals, the mentioned cities and along the border. The results shared are general indicators and are not statistically representative.

Following the incorporation of the new special administrative sanctioning procedure (PASEE) in November 2023, which allowed for the deportation of foreigners in an irregular situation or of those linked to criminal activities, to neighbouring countries, such as to

Ecuador and Bolivia (for more details, see Q4 2023), 58 deportations (of Venezuelans and other nationals) took place in the first quarter of the year (5 in Piura, 2 in Iquitos, 23 in Trujillo, 21 in Arequipa and 17 in La Libertad).

CHILE



Broader regional dynamics, including political instability, increasing crime, legal barriers and economic fluctuations in neighbouring countries also impacted movement dynamics in Chile during the first quarter of the year, alongside domestic developments such as the wildfires in western Chile and increasing stigmatization of

Venezuelan refugees and migrants fueled by a series of incidents involving Venezuelans.

While the total estimated regular and irregular **entries** to Chile increased significantly compared to the previous quarter, the overall entries remained lower than the same period in 2023 (75,400 in Q1 2024 and 82,100 in Q1 2023).

Historically, the beginning of the year tends to see an increase in entries as refugees and migrants return to their host countries following temporary visits to their country of origin at the end of the year, while the relative decrease of entries in 2024, compared to 2023, may be related to the ongoing border security measures implemented last year. As concerns their movement dynamics, the National R4V Platform's flow monitoring and population profiling tool ("*herramienta de caracterización y monitoreo de flujos*") indicated an increase in Venezuelan refugees and migrants coming from previous host countries, such as Ecuador and Colombia with a view to finding greater economic stability, family reunification opportunities, and due to political and security situations in other host countries of the region.

Similar factors also contributed to the lower number of regular **exits** observed from Chile compared to the previous quarter. Yet, the number of exits remained higher than the corresponding period in 2023 (70,600 in Q1 2024 and 64,000 in Q1 2023). Regarding irregular exits, the numbers at the Arica-Tacna border with Peru exceeded those recorded at the Colchane-Pisiga border with Bolivia, understood to be due to the difficult geographic and climatic conditions of the area.

The overall increase in exits of Venezuelans from Chile has largely been attributed to a lack of (regular) employment opportunities, limited regularization options and increasing levels of xenophobia and discrimination, as observed by R4V partners, following media coverage spotlighting high-profile crimes allegedly committed by Venezuelans in Chile.

The first months of the year also saw [*wildfires ravaging the coastal Valparaiso region*](#). Driven by climate change and the El Niño weather phenomenon, the fires left scores dead and thousands of people homeless. Partners

estimated that refugees and migrants represented some **10%** of the affected population. According to R4V partners, the disaster also led to exacerbation of existing tensions between the government and communities over access to goods and services, particularly regarding housing deficits. Partner observations indicate that this may also have contributed to some refugees and migrants relocating within the country.

Despite efforts to reduce irregular movements, it's estimated that the irregular land crossings of Venezuelan refugees and migrants continue to outweigh the regular entries to Chile. During the reporting period, they were approximately 13 times higher at the Tacna-Arica border with Peru (658 regular and 8,800 irregular entries) and 50 times higher than the regular entries at the Colchane-Pisiga border with Bolivia (198 regular and 9,800 irregular entries). Inversely, considering the overall flows to-from Chile, including those by air, regular movements notably outweigh irregular ones.


In February, the government of Chile amended and introduced new legislative norms impacting the protection space of refugees in Chile (pursuant to [*Law No. 20.430*](#)). Pursuant to [*Law No. 21.655*](#) access to asylum requires an individual claimant to either arrive directly from the territory where his/her life or freedom was at risk, or to have spent less than 60 days in-transit via third countries, and that the asylum claim is submitted within 7 days of entry to Chile. [*Law No. 21.325*](#), on measures regarding the immediate return of individuals entering Chile irregularly, was also amended to extend the geographic applicability of this measure by 10 kms, and extended the period during which a removed person cannot legally enter Chile from six months to one year. The impact of these legislative changes remains to be seen in future quarters.

BRAZIL

The overall numbers of regular entries and exits of refugees and migrants from Venezuela to Brazil during the first three months of the year were similar to the previous quarter. However, compared to the same period in 2023, an increase was observed in exits (16,700 in Q1 2023 and 19,400 in Q1 2024), while overall entries were slightly lower (51,800 in Q1 2023 to 48,200 in Q1 2024), resulting in an overall decrease in the migratory balance of Q1 of 2024 of 18% (compared to same period in 2023).

While the majority of movements occurred along the northern border with Venezuela (Pacaraima), the first quarter also saw an increase in regular entries from Peru (Assis Brasil), reaching an average of 414 monthly entries, compared to 300 in the previous quarter. Similarly, an increase in arrivals was observed at the border with Bolivia (Corumbá), with average monthly entries rising from 97 to 126 during the first three months of the year.

REGULAR ENTRIES AND EXITS OF VENEZUELAN TO AND FROM BRAZIL



Note: Out of the total entries in Q1 2024, 31.3K (64.8%) corresponded to entries via the land border with Pacaraima, while in the case of exits, there were 3.1K (16.2%) of exits that took place via this land border with Venezuela.

Source:

Brazilian Federal Police's International Traffic System: Observatory of International Migration (OBMigra) Migration Reports [2023](#) and [2024](#).

Through [surveys](#) undertaken at the Pacaraima border with Venezuela, R4V partners found that similar to previous quarters, a large majority (83%) intended only to temporarily visit their country of origin, before returning to Brazil. In comparison to the previous quarter, when 11% had indicated their intention to return to Venezuela

definitively, during the first three months of 2024, 17% expressed the same intention. Among the Venezuelans who intended to remain in Venezuela (17%), 29% cited the lack of job opportunities in Brazil as the reason, while 10% indicated insufficient income as their primary reason to return.

SOUTHERN CONE SUB-REGION


The countries of the sub-region have largely been considered by refugees and migrants as destination countries, with Bolivia marking a notable exception, serving primarily as a transit country and in which refugees and migrants (of various nationalities) cross in an irregular manner to reach neighboring countries. During the first quarter of the year, according to R4V partner estimates,¹² **Bolivia** saw some 10,300 irregular

entries of Venezuelan refugees and migrants, marking a 20% decrease from the previous quarters (12,700 in Q4 2023). In contrast, irregular exits of Venezuelans from Bolivia to neighbouring countries, totaled 15,000 exits in the first quarter, a sharp decline compared to 22,500 in Q4 2023. The considerable decrease in exits from Bolivia was observed at both the Colchane-Pisiga border with Chile (from 13,000 in Q4 to 9,700 in Q1) and the Desaguadero

[12] IOM DTMs in the border points with Peru ([Desaguadero](#)) and Chile ([Pisiga](#)).

border with Peru (from 9,500 in Q4 to 5,300 in Q1). The decrease in exits at the border with Chile can be attributed to seasonal factors, with movements gradually slowing down towards the end of the summer season due to the

favorable weather and easier conditions to transit. The decrease in exits to Peru may be attributed to the new legislative measures introduced in November 2023 (see [Q4](#) for more information).




In the first quarter of the year, **Paraguay** experienced an increase in both entries (2,148) and exits (2,064) of Venezuelans compared to same time period in 2023 (1,784 entries and 1,841 exits) as well as the fourth quarter of 2023 (1,769 entries and 1,885 exits). Additionally, while overall entries only slightly surpassed the number of exits, it marked the first time Paraguay recorded a positive balance since August 2022. As observed in previous quarters, the majority of entries (76%) and exits (74%) occurred through the Silvio Pettrossi International Airport or through the land border crossings with Argentina (José Falcón/Clorinda) or Brazil (Ciudad del Este). Most


movements through these borders are understood to be of pendular nature.

In **Uruguay**, aligned with historical trends, the regular entries increased and exits decreased at the beginning of the year. Both regular exits and entries reported in Q1 in 2024 followed a similar pattern to the figures reported in Q1 in 2023, with the exception that the entry figures were overall lower in the first quarter of 2024 (12,921) than 2023 (15,616). The overall migratory balance nevertheless remains positive, albeit not as defined as in 2023.

REGULAR ENTRIES AND EXITS OF VENEZUELANS TO AND FROM PARAGUAY



REGULAR ENTRIES AND EXITS OF VENEZUELANS TO AND FROM URUGUAY




Sources:

National Migration Directorate of Paraguay

National Migration Directorate of Uruguay

In Argentina, movements have been steadily increasing in both entries and exits. However, during the first three months of the year, the number of exits increased by 16% compared to the same period in 2023 (52,100 exits in Q1 2024 and 44,900 exits in Q1 2023). This increase surpasses the total exits for all quarters

of 2023. Consequently, the net balance was slightly negative in Q1, reaching -2,152 in the quarter. This shift may be attributed to the deteriorating socio-economic scenario in the country, especially impacting the most vulnerable population, marked by escalating poverty and unemployment rates.




CARIBBEAN SUB-REGION

Visa and entry requirements continued to impede regular access to countries in the Caribbean sub-region, leading to refugees and migrants resorting to irregular sea routes and transportation to reach Aruba, Curaçao and Trinidad and Tobago. Despite boats being intercepted during the reporting period, based on the number of Venezuelans identified and apprehended by respective Coast Guards en route to these islands, R4V partners perceived a slight decrease in the number of irregular entries of Venezuelans compared to the previous quarter.

In **Aruba**, on [24 March](#), the coast guard intercepted a boat carrying 9 Venezuelans. In **Curaçao**, R4V partners reported the arrival of one boat with Venezuelan passengers in January, but details were unavailable. In **Trinidad and Tobago**, on [8 January](#), reports emerged regarding the detention of 4 women who allegedly arrived by boat crossing from Venezuela to Trinidad and Tobago. Another boat was intercepted by the Coast Guard on [1 February](#), leading to the detention of 27 individuals, including 3 children, who attempted to enter Trinidad and Tobago irregularly.

MAIN ROUTES USED BY REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN THE SUB-REGION



In **Guyana**, following reports of perceived changes in local immigration practices (see [Q4 Movements Report](#)), the Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated in March the government's long-term objective to ensure the [integration of Venezuelans](#) in Guyana. Nevertheless, according to R4V partners' observations, two incidents of pushbacks of Venezuelans occurred in early February at a river crossing in Region 1. Among the two groups, which included 14 and 78 Venezuelans, respectively, a majority were denied entry to Guyana and were forced to return using the same boat they arrived on. Both groups included women and children.

Furthermore, the Central Immigration and Passport Office reported the cumulative issuance of 22,677 stay permits (valid for an initial 3 months, renewable for subsequent 6-month periods) since January 2018, out of which 1,778 new permits were issued between July 2023 and March 2024.

In the **Dominican Republic**, the number of regular entries and exits of Venezuelans decreased during the first three months of the year (23,250 entries and 24,574 exits) compared to the final quarter of 2023 (27,381 entries and 25,225 exits). February marked the lowest number

of monthly entries (6,734) and exits (6,633). Similarly to previous years and associated with seasonal factors like holiday travels, the month of February is typically associated with a decrease in both regular entries and exits.

While no large-scale returns or repatriations took place during the reporting period, R4V partners in Trinidad and Tobago noted that Venezuelans, including asylum-seekers and refugees, continued receiving deportation orders by the Immigration Division or Minister of National Security. Some are offered voluntary departure grants while others are expected to purchase one-way tickets themselves.

While no changes were observed concerning return movements to Venezuela, an R4V partner facilitated counselling sessions for 15 Venezuelans wishing to leave Trinidad and Tobago, including through self-organized voluntary return. Some noted wanting to return and stay in their country of origin, while others expressed intentions to engage in onward movements and continue to a third country, such as the US and Spain. Exits and returns were undertaken both regularly and irregularly, depending on the availability of travel documentation and/or intended destination.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report refers to the quarterly consolidation of information on the main movement trends of refugees and migrants throughout the 17 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that are part of the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela (R4V). Its primary objective is to provide analysis and key findings on such trends, including the impact of policies influencing movements of refugees and migrants across the region.

The analysis presented in this report is based on two main types of data: official government figures -primarily on regular movements - and estimates of irregular movements, with varying methodologies and sources according to the country (see sources section at the beginning). The analysis herein is based on the interpretation and consolidation of both types of data collected by the National R4V Platforms, complemented by a regional analysis. The routes represented on the maps are prepared based on the information provided by the National Platforms.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Since this report is based on various sources of information, methodologies and geographical coverage, its main objective is to offer a regional overview and understanding of the various simultaneous dynamics and magnitudes of movements of refugees and migrants. The figures included in the report should not be interpreted as exact comparable figures between the 17 R4V countries.

REGIONAL PLATFORM COORDINATORS

Philippe Sacher

sacher@unhcr.org

Zachary Thomas

zthomas@iom.int

See response:



[RMRP.R4V.INFO](https://rmrp.r4v.info)